Reforming H shares based on comprehensive event studies. by Xu, Zhi. & Chinese University of Hong Kong Graduate School. Division of Business Administration.
Reforming H Shares Based on Comprehensive Event Studies 
Xu Zhi 
A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment 
of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Philosophy 
In 
Finance 
©The Chinese University of Hong Kong 
March 2001 
The Chinese University of Hong Kong holds the copyright of this thesis. Any person(s) intending to 
use a part or whole of the materials in the thesis in a proposed publication must seek copyright release 
from the Dean of the Graduate School 
m 11 APR 12 ; |1 
^OP^ IBPiARY SYSTEfi^ X^^  
ABSTRACT 
Reforming H Shares Based on Comprehensive Event Studies 
Submitted by Xu Zhi 
for the degree of Master of Philosophy in Finance 
at the Chinese University of Hong Kong in December, 2000 
Since H shares came into being in 1993, most of them have failed to raise additional 
fiinds from the market. H shares have underperformed in the market, and the 
investors have lost interest in them. Therefore, the reform of H shares is necessary. 
This paper looks at the impacts that seven events (good earnings announcements, bad 
earnings announcements, good news, bad news, merger & acquisition, seasonal 
equity offerings and new projects) had on H shares in the Hong Kong stock market 
between 1993 and 1998. First, the cumulative abnormal returns of good earnings 
announcements or new projects are significantly positive. Second, the market reacts 
differently to good earnings and bad earnings. Bad earnings are well anticipated, and 
their announcements do not have any significant impact. Therefore, H shares, as a 
whole body, are generally considered to have bad expectation. Nevertheless, the 
market hopefully waits for their improvement. Further evidence from a regression 
analysis of bad earnings announcements' two-day-cumulative abnormal returns 
reveals that in the market belief, H shares will bottom out after a consecutive three-
year decline in sales. Hence, H shares, irrespective of the fact that they originate in 
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China, are fairly treated in Hong Kong. Third, with regard to good earnings 
announcements, the regression analysis finds that the higher returns on assets bring 
in a more positive market reaction. This reflects a market requirement that H shares 
should enhance the profitability of total assets and also implies that H shares should 
enter a fast growing industry. Last, new projects have the largest positive cumulative 
abnormal return among the seven events. From that, it can be further inferred that H 
shares should become involved in fast growing businesses through new projects. So, 
like the local shares, H shares need to be more aggressive in high-tech development 
and new business exploration. 
H shares have virtually been integrated into the dynamic Hong Kong stock 
market. These event studies explore the possibility and provide guidance for the 
restructuring of H shares. In the wake of high-tech products, H shares should put 
more money into research and development. However, if H shares lack good 
corporate governance, they will not make any consistent progress. So, a practical 
framework of good corporate governance must be designed to transform the Chinese 
economy in the direction of free market. The core of the framework includes at least 
two long-term large shareholders, one main bank or large creditor, mandatory public 
debt financing and incentive contracts. Its success requires government intervention. 
The political forces should focus on establishing and enforcing the law efficiently 
and effectively in order to protect the minority shareholder, set up a complete capital 
market, and start compulsory privatization on some levels. The government should 
continue to play a key role in implementing the reform smoothly to ensure that mass 
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privatization is not accompanied by any expropriation of assets by the management. 
Mutual funds as potential large shareholder of extreme importance and these mutual 
funds should be open-ended and managed by the private companies to protect the 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
The China Securities Regulatory Committee (CSRC), the ultimate securities 
authority, initiated an ambitious plan in 1993 and arranged for the first batch of state 
owned enterprises (SOEs) to go public in the Hong Kong stock market. In order to 
accelerate the implementation of the plan, the CSRC allowed those companies to 
simultaneously record their business activities under both China's and Hong Kong's 
accounting standards. The primary goals were a) to raise funds from overseas 
investors and b) to improve industrial management through the participation of 
outside directors. The market appeared enthusiastic to H shares as they came to be 
known, the early responses were encouraging and the listings went through smoothly 
until 1995. H shares prices fell because disclosures of their bad earnings scared away 
investors. As a result, the number of new listings has been decreasing since 1995 and 
deteriorated even further after the Asian financial tumult in 1997. Some companies 
lacked enough subscriptions and withdrew their listing applications. Moreover, only 
2 out of 42 H shares have offered three seasonal equity issues subsequent to their 
listings. As a result, most of H shares could not attract external financing in the Hong 
Kong stock market after going public. Figure 1.1 shows the non-trivial deviation of 
the Hang Seng China Enterprises (HSCEI) from the Hang Seng Index (HSI), and this 
difference raises great concerns that H shares will lose their function and become 
blueprints for trash stocks. 
Table 1.1 shows that there are 44 H shares on March 1,2000. H shares are 
� 6% of the total number of traded stocks in the Hong Kong stock market, but the 
whole market capitalization of H shares is 5576 millions USD, occupying 
approximately 1% of the total market value. This relatively small market 
capitalization implies that their poor operation outcomes cannot support a relatively 
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high price. Nevertheless, the China Securities Regulatory Committee has been 
attempting to list more SOEs. When the stock market recovered to its historical level 
in 1999, the administration authorized three companies to go public, but the booming 
market has ignored them. This suggests that H shares need fundamental reforms and 
necessary restructures should be undertaken. Since a comprehensive reference to 
tackle these problems is not available, this thesis leads the way in providing rational 
insights into the needed renovation, and addresses the poor situation of H shares. The 
forthcoming suggestions are based on widespread event studies, which investigate 
stock movement and the interests of investors. The empirical results will help 
eliminate uncertainty on the road to reform. 
The conventional wisdom of cashing out poor quality assets of state owned 
companies should be abandoned. Since the market is rational, and the sunset 
industries which H shares belong to have low returns on assets, it is time to adopt a 
new approach and stop the practice of selling off bad assets to the market. Potential 
H shares should come from fast growing businesses. Overseas investment should be 
used to restructure ownership, improve corporate governance and enhance 
operational performance. These companies will be flagship companies equipped with 
high-tech and gradually acquire more SOEs. If this takes place, the expansion of H 
shares can play a leading role in economic reform. 
Chapter one explains why thorough research is urgently needed in H Shares, 
and provides an outline of this thesis. 
In chapter two, financial analysis is expanded in detail. The historical 
financial data will be exploited to summarize H shares in terms of ownership 
structure, EPS, P/E, tangible value to book value, EBIT margin, ROE, ROA, 
inventory turnover, account receivable turnover, account receivables to equity, long 
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term debt to equity, and tangible equity to assets. A comprehensive fundamental 
analysis was conducted to answer the following questions: 1) Have H shares 
improved their operational management after their listings? 2) If so, why are their 
profits unsatisfactory? 3) How do investors perceive H shares, namely what is the 
perception of H shares in the stock market? Although the financial ratios of H shares 
are up to the average international standard, consecutive recession of sales implies 
that their products are not competitive, and that H shares urgently need high-tech 
innovations. Moreover, compared with international corporations, H shares have a 
very low market share. Thus, they are easily susceptible to any economic recession. 
Chapter three discusses the methodology of event studies and is a prelude to 
the wide-ranging event studies in chapter four. Those seven events are good 
earnings, bad earnings, good news, bad news, M&A, new projects and seasonal 
equity offerings. Further, for good and bad earnings announcements, long-term drifts 
are measured, and cross-sectional regressions are analyzed. The seven events are 
included to answer the questions: 1) do good earnings and bad earnings have 
different effects on H shares market value in a short time? If so, will the different 
effect last for a long time? If long-term abnormal returns are existent, will it explain 
how the market responded differently to H shares? Where do the abnormal returns 
come from? 2) Suppose the market is interested in H shares, how enthusiastic is the 
market to H shares? I collect general news about H shares from the general media 
and categorize them into good news and bad news. If the market were sensitive to the 
news about H shares, good news would have had different impacts than bad news. 3) 
The impacts of M&A, SEOs and new projects are investigated to assess whether the 
market responds differently to them. The explanations to the different responses are 
the basis for my suggestions on restructuring H shares. Therefore, the clarification of 
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those events is necessarily clear, otherwise the results will be misleading. M&A are 
announced in prospectus, so they are known in advance, although their timings are 
not certain; SEOs presents the seasonal fiind raisings to replenish the working 
capital; and new projects, which are out of the traditional business, surprise the 
market. In sum, all the empirical results confirm that the market welcomed H shares' 
improvement in operation results, especially the entry to a fast growing business 
through new projects. But the market did not respond significantly to news reports. 
Therefore, the market is cautious and rational when it receives news. 
Chapter five focuses on corporate governance. China has made great progress 
in its economic reforms. However, corporate governance is a very new concept in 
China. The role of market mechanisms depends on a successful corporate 
governance system. Mass privatization is widely accepted. Since the population in 
China is huge, privatization will immediately lead to the very dispersion of 
ownership. The management will expropriate assets as occurred in Russia. That is 
the reason why the procedure of privatization should receive equal attention. A 
practical framework of good corporate governance should be designed especially for 
Chinese enterprises. Under its framework, while the minority shareholder is 
protected as well as the large one, award to the management will produce a number 
of rich and competent businessman who will take up the responsibility of leading the 
Chinese economy into mass privatization without impairing fairness. The framework 
is based on the latest findings of successful corporate governance in western 
countries and the recent experience of Russia and the Czech Republic. Thus, the first 
part of chapter five summarizes the problems which corporate governance has to 
tackle, and assesses the solutions to the problems in terms of strengths and weakness. 
Given the current situation of H shares, a framework for good corporate governance 
4 
is provided while key points are emphasized. The conclusions are made in chapter 
six. They combine new findings in event studies and analysis in good corporate 
governance into practical solutions. As recently as two decades ago，China started its 
economic reforms. But the economic measures that have been taken so far are macro 
and primitive. The sophisticated reforms at corporate levels or in terms of the 
building up of the market microstructure have not yet begun because corporate 
governance is much more complicated and comprehensive than macroeconomic 
system reforms. Now, China lacks matching reforms, such as reforms of its legal 
system and political elections, which are necessary to safeguard a free and fair 
market. Of course, talents in finance, law, accounting and other business 
management are also crucial to the success of the reforms at corporate levels. 
Although it will take much time, it will be beneficial to start these reforms seriously 
now. Otherwise, the state owned assets will eventually become worthless. Social 
welfare cannot be set up since its financial sources will no longer exist. It is hoped 
that the conclusions remind the government of the necessity of executing the reforms 
in a more scientific way with the help of qualified financial researchers and 
entrepreneurs. 
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Chapter 2 Value or Growth Stock? 
Chapter two highlights the financial status of H shares. Since a) there is a 
large difference in operation results between blue chips and bad companies in the 
Hong Kong stock market, b) many of Hong Kong companies concentrate in real 
estate business and c) the Hong Kong market has very strong correlation with the US 
market, the financial ratios of US companies are employed as the benchmark to 
assess the financial situation of H shares. Are they value stocks or growth stocks? If 
H shares lack a clear image in the marketplace, they will not be able to raise 
sufficient external financing. 
The principal data source used here is the annual reports of H shares. Other 
complementary channels, such as Datastream, Reuters, HSBC brokerage cards, 
China Info Bank and Internet e-finet financial information center, are also used. 
The agent-principal problem is of major concern for Chinese economic 
reform. At present, the main industries are absolutely controlled by state capital and 
operated by the management team appointed by the state. Although mass 
privatization is not possible overnight, China has been undertaking a great change 
through other cautious methods. The floating of H shares is a courageous experiment 
to absorb overseas shareholders. But, the trial has not gone far enough. Table 2.1 
shows current ownership structure in China's H share companies. On average, 
61.08% of total shares are held by the state; 7.49% is being floated in the mainland 
market; and the other 31.43% is being traded in the Hong Kong market. If the 
. management does not heed any good advice, outside directors have no decision-
making power. But foreign investors have to take the risk of any wrong investment 
decision made by the management team, therefore some foreign institutional 
investors sold back their shares to the H share parent firms. This kind of transaction 
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harms market confidence. Therefore, the management team should be provided with 
more incentives and be required to be more transparent in its decision making. These 
problems will be discussed in detail in chapter four. 
Table 2.1 Ownership Structure of H shares  
•• H  _ _ n _ _ w 内 … _ •••www ••mnnnnni _ mwmm • _ _ • • *mu _•_••• •awmnnnni • • •wmwwnnnnnnnnnnoon'H w  •wmif： 
State Shares A Shares H Shares 
Consumer Product 61.44% 3.53% 36.21% 
Energy 72.90% 0.00% 27.10% 
Machine 61.83% 3.96% 36.85% 
Medicine 56.89% 21.93% 32.14% 
Property 62.13% 0.00% 37.87% 
R a w Material 62.68% 9.81% 32.42% 
Transportation 65.82% 5.86% 32.51% 
H Shares 61.08% 7.49% 31.43% 
Data updated on June 2000. 
2.1 Summary Statistics: Financial Ratios o f H Shares 
2.1.1 Profitability analysis 
Table 2.2 shows the average EPS of H shares has been falling since they went 
public. Although the pace of decline is slowing down, large losses occurred in the 
raw materials and transportation industries in 1997 and 1998. 5 of 7 industries had 
worse results than before in 1998. 
Table 2.2 Earnings per share by the year  
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
.••己 W k . N/A." 0"360 ai63 O.'SOO  
Energy N/A. N/A. 0.000 0.235 0.286 
Machine 0.219 0.060 0.077 0.148 0.060 
Medicine 0.232 0.325 0.150 0.110 0.046 
Property N/A. N/A. N/A. 0.231 0.165 
Raw Material 0.166 0.167 0.063 -0.012 0.073 
Transportation 0.130 0.120 0.193 0.147 -0.018 
…H Shares 0.194 0.145 0.121 0.096 0.087 
In comparison with blue chips in the Hong Kong stock market, H shares are 
relatively small. Therefore, as small sized firms, H shares should have obtained a 
higher growth rate in EPS than blue chips. But H shares have a larger volatility in 
EPS in each industrial sector. Their weak customer base and ineffective market 
expansions cause more variability. Last, all the EPS are below 0.36 per share, which 
is at the low level. 
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Also in table 2.2, medicine EPS was at its highest in 1995, but it has 
decreased at an increasing pace since then; Although the consumer goods industry 
was also affected by the financial crisis in 1997, its EPS recovered to its 1996 level. 
This difference is attributed to a private manufacturer, which generated a large 
proportion of profit inside the consumer goods industry. 
Table 2.3 Return on Equity by the Year 
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Consumer Product NTA � 13.49% 3.93% 17.30% 
Energy N/A N/A N/A 15.23% 11.12% 
Machine 8.75% 3.20% 4.99% 5.96% 3.03% 
Medicine 16.19% 20.00% 8.58% 4.47% 5.15% 
Property N/A N/A N/A 5.56% 6.28% 
Raw Material 8.59% 6.17% 3.21% 3.45% 0.61% 
Transportation 7.90% 7.00% 4.72% 5.67% -4.64% 
H Shares 、 9.14% 6.16% 5.97% 4.90% 4.06% 
In table 2.3, H shares ROE (weighted average ratio) went down from 9.14% 
in 1994 to 4.06% in 1998. However, the figure changes within a range of 4% to 9%, 
the same average level for a US firm. The drop of ROE is of a large magnitude 
because H shares acquired their subsidiaries too soon. Political forces replaced 
economic factors as a guide to M&A and explains the absence of a profit-oriented 
investment decision-making process.  
Table 2.4 Return on Assets by the Year  
1994"-" 19^ ^  
Consumer Product 4.60% 9.48% 6.46% 0.00% 3.45% 
Energy N/A N/A 5.80% 1.80% 13.00% 
Machine 4.65% 0.00% 3.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Medicine 4.11% 2.77% 5.35% 2.19% 7.26% 
Property N/A N/A N/A 3.61% 3.56% 
Raw Material 2.44% 2.72% 4.97% 3.24% 5.93% 
Transportation 4.13% 3.40% 1.53% 2.62% 1.08% 
H Shares 6.55% 0.68% 6.41% 4.68% 2.23% 
Table 2.4 shows that H Shares ROA (weighted average ratio) decreased more 
� than return on equity. ROA decreased from 6.55% to 2% and ROE from 9.14% to 
4.06%. So, the acquired assets were not good enough to produce more profits. The 
bottom line of M&A is reduction of cost, increase of output and increase in profit. 
The reality is that H shares did not meet the minimum requirements. The inference is 
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not true if the EBIT margin (= EBIT/Sales) is low also due to the market contraction. 
Table 2.5 shows, however, that the recession did not affect the EBIT margin 
(weighted average ratio), which remained flat at around 15%. Hence, the 
plummeting of ROA is explainable by stalemate sales. Since on average, sales to 
output ratio is approximately 100%, M&A did not lead to the same rise of output as 
that of total assets in percentage. Therefore, shareholders do not benefit from M&A 
activities. 
Table 2.5 EBIT margin by the Year 
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Consumer Product N/A 12.06% 9.61% 19.65% 
Energy N/A N/A N/A 38.81% 36.00% 
Machine 16.21% 4.00% 8.60% 11.93% 7.51% 
Medicine 22.63% 24.00% 13.83% 8.44% 4.50% 
Property N/A N/A N/A 29.45% 16.20% 
Raw Material 14.86% 9.96% 2.92% 11.74% 4.49% 
Transportation 11.54% 10.00% 46.52% 44.81% 36.38% 
H Shares 15.66% 8.84% 12.40% 18.43% 14.51% 
In short, H shares have a small market share and lack motivation to expand 
their markets; Second, H shares absorb some bad assets through M&A. Therefore, 
the EPS decreases mainly due to economic contraction and too rapid expansion 
through unreasonable M&A. 
2.1.2 Debt Structure 
Table 2.6 shows that on average, tangible equity is about 60% of total assets. 
So 40% of debt ratio is not high. 
Table 2.6 Tangible Equity to Assets Ratios by the Year 
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
58:互吕玩- 7 ^ 6 5 % 4 8 7 4 2 % 4 3 . 7 0 % 
Energy N/A N/A 60.42% 49.80% 62.00% 
Machine 73.02% 70.02% 45.00% 43.00% 44.00% 
Medicine 61.87% 47.49% 61.71% 68.98% 51.09% 
Property N/A N/A 71.74% 59.37% 50.20% 
Raw Material 52.33% 73.84% 56.90% 59.90% 38.97% 
‘ Transportation 74.25% 61.72% 54.28% 52.95% 71.38% 
.H Shares 54.10% 53.92% 59.05% 74.52% 60.86% 
Table 2.7 shows the increase of long term debt to equity ratio. The rise 
reflects the fact that H shares can no longer raise money from the stock market. The 
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long term financing ratio is approximately 29% in 1998. The level is a little higher 
than 25% that U.S. companies have. If 1-2% of deflation, which China had in 1997 
and 1998, also considered，the ratio is a little higher than the normal level. However, 
it is still at an acceptable level. 
Table 2.7 Ratios of Long Term Debtjo E�i^bj^the Year 
-…… 1 9 9 4 〒§互5」」」 …1巨台6丨丨 1 9 9 7 …可吞台各 
Consumer P r o d u c t W K W K 11.63% 4.05% 3.83% 
Energy N/A N/A N/A 38.09% 46.87% 
Machine 23.99% 31.00% 36.37% 34.17% 37.30% 
Medicine 22.97% 17.00% 16.42% 13.53% 16.02% 
Property N/A N/A N/A 3.44% 0.50% 
Raw Material 8.82% 6.51% 11.10% 9.86% 12.54% 
Transportation 42.56% 46.00% 26.05% 49.92% 67.27% 
H Shares 17.66% 18.83% 21.06% 22.66% 28.19% 
In table 2.8, account receivables is around 60% of equity. The ratio of 
account receivables to equity has been remaining stable since 1994. Therefore, any 
short-term financial deterioration of account receivables cannot cause any 
bankruptcy. 
Table 2.8 Ratios of Account Receivables to Equity  
1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 " n 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8 
Consumer Product W K � 5 1 . 0 9 % 5 6 . 9 0 % 5 4 . 1 0 % 
Energy N/A N/A N/A 38.97% 5 9 . 0 5 % 
Machine 4 8 . 4 2 % 4 9 . 8 0 % 4 7 . 4 9 % 5 0 . 2 0 % 5 4 . 2 8 % 
Medicine 5 8 . 5 6 % 6 2 . 0 0 % 6 1 . 7 1 % 5 2 . 3 3 % 5 2 . 9 5 % 
Property N/A N/A N/A 7 4 . 2 5 % 74.52% 
Raw Material 7 1 . 6 5 % 7 3 . 0 2 % 6 8 . 9 8 % 7 3 . 8 4 % 7 1 . 3 8 % 
Transportation 43.70% 44.00% 71.74% 5 9 . 9 0 % 53.92% 
H Shares 6 0 . 4 2 % 6 1 . 8 7 % 5 9 . 3 7 % 6 1 . 7 2 % 6 0 . 8 6 % 
In sum, according to the American standard, the long-term debt ratio is 
relatively high. H shares will have to borrow too much long-term debt to finance 
new projects since it is difficult to raise funds from the stock market. Although the 
current level is not dangerous, the rising trend should be halted. Otherwise the heavy 
interests on long-term debt will drain the cash flow and the normal expansion cannot 
be financed in the near future. 
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2.1.3 Operational Management 
Table 2.9 Account Receivable Turnover by the Year  
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
"CorisumerPrndud W/.A. N/A - 顶 •� 巧  
Energy N/A N/A N/A 37.02 21.42 
Machine 2.10 4.52 5.29 6.04 5.13 
Medicine 9.78 11.31 8.74 5.06 5.97 
Property N/A N/A N/A 7.60 7.38 
Raw Material 10.51 12.10 12.22 8.90 15.57 
Transportation 5.85 8.54 16.96 16.20 20.20 
H Shares Ija 9J5 12.13 
Table 2.9 shows the account receivables turnover is 12 in 1998, similar to that 
of U.S. companies. Turnover is not as good in consumer and machinery industries as 
others. 
Table 2.10 Inventory Turnover by the Year 
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 " " 
Consumer Product NAA nZ^ 375 ^ 
Energy N/A N/A N/A 14.04 13.09 
Machine 6.80 8.80 7.63 7.50 7.61 
Medicine 3.66 3.92 4.43 2.84 4.45 
Property N/A N/A N/A 0.76 1.57 
Raw Material 3.35 3.80 4.48 4.99 6.14 
Transportation 6.99 6.23 17.32 56.19 41.82 
"•…H,Shares 4.86 5T7 6.98 14.88 12.84 
Table 2.10 shows that inventory turnover was speeding up. However, it 
happened while the output was below the optimal level. This implies that the output 
was curbed in the economic recession. 
In sum, H shares operate at a cautious level during the economic recession. 
Their management team paid much attention to account receivables and made 
progress in financial management because their ratios are much better than average 
level of SOEs in the mainland market. Therefore, the floating of H shares in the 
‘ Hong Kong market has improved the management. 
2.2 Corporate Identity: Value or Growth Stock? 
Any publicly traded firm has its own image in the stock market. Its stock is 
simply divided into value stock and growth stock. Trzcinka (1998) discussed their 
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definitions. Although the definitions are very imprecise, most institutional investors 
agree that a value stock pays a relatively high dividend, suggesting that the firm is a 
leading player in its industry and executes a provident financial management in order 
to obtain a low cost to profit ratio. The growth stock is in the fast growing businesses 
where the average annual growth rate of EPS is over 25%. The growth stock is a 
pioneer in the marketplace and invests heavily in R&D. both value and growth stocks 
maintain good relationships inside the capital market. 
2.2.1 Are H Shares Value Stocks? 
Basically, H shares carry out a provident financial management policy. But 
their market shares are small, and their market expansions are not fruitfiil. Their 
profits have been declining since 1993. Excluding a special H share of GD Kelon, a 
private company, max dividends of H shares are 0.18,0.16,0.12,0.37 and 0.1 from 
1994 to 1998. The level of max dividends is low, and many of them stopped to 
distribute dividend since their IPOs. Hence, H shares do not qualify as value stocks. 
2.2.2 Are H Shares Growth Stocks? 
In table 2.11 the high P/E ratios are listed. They move in a range o f - 8 to 36. 
These ratios are not large enough to indicate H shares are high growth stocks with 
high P/E ratios. 
Table 2.11 High P/E Ratios by the Year 
1994 1995 1996 1997 
Consumer Product W/K 8 'Se… 
Energy N/A N/A N/A 23 
Machine 15.21 36.38 23.70 28.00 
Medicine 15.22 8.18 18.00 18.33 
Property N/A N/A N/A 22.83 
Raw Material 25 20 35 -8 
Transportation 14.62 15.83 19.00 24.71 
The MV/BV at the end of April is 1.64, 0.94, 0.72,1.17 and 0.70 from 1994 to 
1998. The American growth stock has the ratio of 2-3. So, MV/BV ratios of H shares 
are relatively low. Further evidence is obtained from Table2.12. The tangible value 
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to book value is over 99%. So, H shares possess a very low percentage of valuable 
intangible assets such as patents, inventions and strong franchises. 
Table 2.12 Ratios of Tangible Value to Book Value by the Year  
Industry Type Tangible Value /Book Value 
"H'shaFes 99762% 





Raw Material 97.06% 
Transportation 97.84% 
H shares, therefore, cannot be categorized as growth stocks. 
It is concluded that H shares lack a clear image. As a result, investors have no 
definitive motivation to purchase them. 
2.3 Summary 
H shares have conducted a provident financial policy. Their financial ratios 
are almost healthy, but their real problems are inefficient market expansion and a 
shortage of R& D investment. A part of the reason is that H shares belong to a set of 
sunset industries: even if they tap the shrinking markets, they cannot increase sales 
significantly. But I think that the main cause of inefficient market expansion is that 
due to state ownership, the management has no incentive to renovate their product 
and expand their business; see discussions in Chapter 5. 
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Chapter 3 The Methodology of Event Studies 
In the dynamic Hong Kong stock market, local companies are strongly 
motivated to renovate their business and maximize the interests of shareholders. In 
contrast, H shares are reluctant to do more and better. So, are H shares demanded by 
the market: dead or alive? Event studies aim to judge whether the market has or has 
not any interest in H shares. If not, event studies will be conducted to find any 
implications as to how to reform H shares and cater for the investors. 
The methodology of event studies will be discussed in this chapter. The 
review includes hypothesis testing, the use of different benchmarks for normal rate of 
return, power of the methodology in different applications and modeling of abnormal 
returns as coefficients in a multivariate regression framework. It also focuses on 
frequently encountered statistical problems in event studies and their solutions. 
Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll (1969) introduced the event study 
methodology. Their landmark paper started a methodological revolution in finance. 
Fama (1991) believed that event studies had been a growing industry during the 
previous 20 years since 1969. Actually, event studies are semi-strong form tests of 
market efficiency, equally illustrating how quickly security prices reflect public 
information announcements. In practice, event studies have been used for two major 
reasons: 1) to test the null hypothesis that the market efficiently incorporates 
information and 2) under the maintained hypothesis of market efficiency, at least 
with respect to publicly available information, to examine the impact of an event on 
the wealth of the company's shareholders. Because event studies come closest to 
allowing a break between market efficiency and equilibrium pricing issues, they give 
the most direct evidence on market efficiency. 
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3.1 Brief Outline of an Event Study 
The structure of an event study has seven steps: 
1. Event definition. The initial task of conducting an event study is to define the 
event of interest and identify the period over which the security prices of the 
companies involved in this event will be examined within the event window. 
2. Selection Criteria. After identifying the event of interest, it is necessary to 
determine the selection criteria for the inclusion of a given company in the study. 
The criteria may involve restrictions imposed by data availability. At this stage it 
is useful to summarize some characteristics of the data sample (e.g., company 
market capitalization, industry representation, distribution of events through 
time) and note any potential biases which may have been introduced through the 
sample selection. 
3. Normal and abnormal returns. To appraise the event's effect we require a 
measure of the abnormal return. The abnormal return is the actual ex post return 
of the security over the event window minus the normal return of the company 
over the event window. The normal return is defined as the return that would be 
expected if the event did not take place. 
s: 二 
where s*tx, Rit, and E(Rit ) are the abnormal , actual and normal returns, 
respectively，for time period t. Xt is the conditioning information for the normal 
performance model. A variety of models have been used in practice to measure 
the normal rate of return, conditional on certain variables, and then to generate 
abnormal return estimates. Models for measuring normal performance are : 
1) mean adjusted returns. The normal return is the average return during the 
estimation window; 
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2) market model. The model is a statistical model, which relates the return of 
any given security to the return of the market portfolio. Actually, it is one 
factor market index model; 
3) market adjusted return model. The model pre-specifies the intercept of the 
market model to 0 and the beta coefficient to 1; 
4) multi-factor models such as the Ross (1976)，s arbitrage pricing theory; 
5) Sharpe (1964) - Lintner (1965) Capital Asset Pricing Model or the Black 
(1972) CAPM. 
4. Estimation procedure. Once a normal performance model has been selected, the 
parameters of the model must be estimated using a subset of the data known as 
the estimation window. The most common choice, when feasible, is to use the 
period prior to the event window for the estimation window. Generally the event 
period itself is not included in the estimation period to prevent the event from 
influencing the normal performance model parameter estimates. 
5. Testing procedure. With the parameter estimates for the normal performance 
model, the abnormal returns can be calculated. Next we need to design the testing 
framework for the abnormal returns. Important considerations are defining the 
null hypothesis and determining the techniques for aggregating the abnormal 
returns of individual company. 
6. Empirical results. The presentation of the empirical results follows the 
formulation of the econometric design. In addition to presenting the basic 
empirical results, the presentation of diagnostics can be fmitful. Occasionally, 
especially in studies with a limited number of event observations, the empirical 
results can be heavily influenced by one or two firms. Knowledge of this is 
important for gauging the importance of the results. 
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7. Interpretation and conclusions. Ideally the empirical results will lead to insights 
about the mechanisms by which the event affects security prices. Additional 
analysis may be included to distinguish between competing explanations. 
3.2 Issues on Event Studies 
The event study employs simple analytical techniques, but the issues on event 
studies are still wide spread. The solutions to them are not only of mathematics, but 
also of financial thoughts. Below we discuss, in return, unknown event dates, the 
choice of the model for the normal return, hypothesis testing and problems with 
heteroskedasticity and dependence, a multivariate regression model, long horizon 
security price performance, and the use of daily or monthly data. 
3.2.1 Unknown Event Dates 
In general, corporate announcements are well guarded to avoid the leakage of 
secret to the public, so event studies that examine the date of formal announcement 
will capture the majority of the effect on stock prices. However, 1) if the market has 
an inside trader who is informed before the formal release of the news, the 
announcement date will be not accurately defined. As with A shares traded in the 
mainland market, H shares could have inside information manipulation; 2) The news 
itself does not have an exact date. For example the general good or bad news in my 
thesis are mainly concerned with the central government policy's effect on H shares. 
The regulatory policy requires approval by many officials. So, it is difficult for all 
the officials to keep the information secret. Brown and Warner (1980) randomly 
designate one month during an event month period as the event month for the 
security and add a constant to the month's return. They then test the hypothesis that 
the cumulative average abnormal return during the eleven-month period equals zero. 
They reject the null hypothesis two to three times less often when the event causes a 
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five percent abnormal return and the event month is not precisely known as opposed 
to the case where the event month is known. Ball and Torous (1988) develop a 
maximum likelihood estimation procedure, which accommodates event date 
uncertainty, and examine results of their explicit procedure versus the informal 
procedure of expanding the event window. The results indicate that the informal 
procedure works well and there is little to gain from the more elaborate estimation 
framework. 
In sum, for events with unknown event date, the event study methodology 
appears to have little statistical power to detect the abnormal returns because the 
market generally anticipates the formal announcements in the process. It seems, 
therefore, that further work in this area would benefit from 1) more careful choice of 
the event date to exclude actions that were expected; 2) linking the abnormal returns 
to firm characteristics using cross sectional regression based on a microeconomic 
analysis of the event. 
3.2.2 Which is the best benchmark model for the normal return? 
To the least, the model misspecification is always a worry in calculating the 
normal return. It can occur either because relevant variables have been omitted or 
irrelevant variables have been included. However, when a large sample of unrelated 
securities is used or the event dates are not clustered in calendar time, the market 
model estimator of the average abnormal return is generally unbiased. 
It is useful to compare the market model with a mean adjusted model. The 
variance of the abnormal return for the market model is 
where R? is the P? of the market model regression for security i. 
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For the mean adjusted model, the variance of the abnormal return is 
Combining these two equations, we have 
=(1-代2)殆 
Since Ri^ lies between zero and one, the variance of the abnormal return using 
the market model will be less than ,or equal to, the abnormal return variance using 
the mean adjusted model. This lower variance for the market model will carry over 
into all the aggregate abnormal return inferences. As a result, using the market model 
can lead to more precise inferences. The gains will be greatest form a sample of 
securities with high market model R statistics. 
In principle further increases in R could be achieved by using a multifactor 
model. In practice, however, the gains in R^ from adding additional factors are 
usually small. The point is explainable by the statistical power of the diverse models. 
Brown and Warner (1980) conduct an extensive examination of event study 
techniques with monthly rerun data from CRSP. They randomly sample securities 
from the data set. To assess the power of event study methods, a constant is added to 
each security's return during a month designated as the event month. Brown and 
Warner use three general methods to estimate abnormal returns:!) mean adjusted 
reurns,2) market adjusted returns and 3) market and risk adjusted returns, including 
market model prediction errors, prediction errors from the Black CAPM and excess 
returns based on the return on a control portfolio. 
When a randomly selected month for each security is designated as the event 
month parametric statistical tests are used, they find similar results for the various 
abnormal return measures. That is, when no abnormal performance is present each 
method rejects the null about as often as is expected owing to chance and the 
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statistical power of the various methods is fairly similar. For example, they report 
that when one or five percent abnormal performance is added to the month's return, 
the market model methodology rejects the null hypothesis 22.8 percent of the time 
and the mean adjusted returns benchmark rejects the 26 percent of the time in on 
tailed tests at the five percent level with a ample of 50 securities. When the same 
calendar month is designated as the event month for each security, i.e. the event 
months are clustered in calendar time, and cross sectional dependence in the 
abnormal return estimators is controlled for in statistical tests, they find results 
similar to those we obtained when there is no clustering. 
Chandra, Moriarty and Willinger (1990) express surprise at the finding by 
Brown and Warner (1980 and 1985) that the mean and market adjusted return 
methodologies are as powerful as the market and risk adjusted return techniques, 
since the latter abnormal return estimators are likely to less noisy. They show 
analytically that the relatively strong performance of the mean adjusted return is a 
statistical artifact, i.e., it is due to the fact that the more powerful Patell test (which 
first standardizes the individual abnormal return estimates) is used by Brown and 
Warner with the mean adjusted return but not with the other two methods. Chandra, 
Moriarty and Willinger re-examine the Brown and Warner results and find that tests 
with the mean adjusted return are less powerful than tests with market adjusted return 
methods seems to derive from the estimation error in the market model parameters, 
which offsets the greater precision in the latter method due to adjusting for risk. 
Similarly, Chandra, Moriarty and Willinger show that the seemingly greater power of 
tests that do not control for cross sectional dependence is due to Brown and Warner's 
use of different test statistics for the methods being compared. When the same 
statistical test is used in pseudo simulations of each method, they find no evidence of 
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an increase in power from ignoring cross-sectional dependence. 
Brown and Weistein (1985) examine the power of multifactor models such as 
the APT in the event study context. Ignoring estimation problems, tests with 
multifactor models will be more powerful than those with market model abnormal 
return estimates, when the multifactor model is correct. However, if factors beyond 
the market return have little explanatory power and their betas were imprecisely 
estimated, the market model may perform better in practice. Brown and Weistein 
(1985) find, given their estimation procedure, that event studies with a multifactor 
model are no more powerful than those using the market model. 
Overall, the results of these various studies indicate that the event study 
methodology is, with some corrections for statistical problems that arise in certain 
cases, a powerful tool to detect the impact of specific events on security prices. Of 
the various methods to measure abnormal returns, which is the best in practice? 
When the sample companies are from unrelated industries, it appears that the market 
model with adjustments for nonsynchronous trading problems when using daily 
returns on thinly traded securities works at least as well as the alternatives. 
3.2.3 Hypothesis testing and problems with heteroskedasticity and dependence 
There are nonparametric and parametric hypothesis testing. 
Nonparametric tests: 
one of this category is sign test: for a test of size (1 —a), Hois rejected if H �> (j)-�(a). 
-IsT I A A � 
J, = 0.5 N(0,1) 
‘ N 0.5 … 
N is the total number of cases, and TsT is the number of cases where the abnormal 
return is positive. Its weakness is that it may not be well specified if the distribution 
of abnormal returns is skewed, as can be the case with daily data. With skewed 
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abnormal returns, the expected proportion of positive abnormal returns can differ 
from one half even under the null hypothesis. In response to this possible 
shortcoming, Corrado (1989) proposes a rank test of the null hypothesis that has no 
abnormal return on event day zero. However, these nonparametric tests are not used 
in isolation but in conjunction with their parametric counterparts. They are useful to 
check the robustness of conclusions based on parametric tests. 
Parametric tests: 
1 N ^ 
— z O a 
J2 = � N m 
J � � 
[到:AW) 
L A - 2 J 台 」 
A 
S. is the standard error of abnormal returns in an estimation window L^ observations, 
N is the number of securities, and is the abnormal return of security i at time = 0. 
When doing an event study one will have to choose between using J2 and J3 
for the test statistic. One would like to choose the statistic with higher power, and 
this will depend on the alternative, then the better choice will give more weight to the 
securities with the lower abnormal return variance, which is what J3 does. On the 
other hand if the true abnormal return is larger for securities with higher variance, 
then the better choice will give equal weight to the realized cumulative abnormal 
return of each security，which is what J2 does. 
There are several potential problems in hypothesis testing, due to the fact that 
frequently the abnormal return estimators are not independent or they do not have 
identical variance. For instance, often the abnormal return estimators are 1) cross 
sectionally correlated in event time, 2) have different variances across companies,3) 
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are not independent across time for a given firm or 4) have greater variance during 
the event period than in the surrounding periods. Actually, h and J3 test statistics are 
used to address the first two problems efficiently. Therefore, the main concerns are 
left to problem 3 and 4. 
Problem 3 is concerned with time series dependence. Under the joint 
hypothesis which states that returns are given by the market model with stationary 
parameter and that the market is informationally efficient, the disturbances in the 
market model are independent across time. Neither the residuals nor the prediction 
errors from the market model are independent across time as assumed in many event 
studies. Since regression residuals are based on the same parameter, their correlation 
is a common fact. Cowan (1991) analyzes the bias in hypothesis tests of cumulative 
average abnormal returns when average abnormal estimators are correlated. The 
degree of bias depends on the number of observations in both the estimation period 
and the event period. When the event period is small relative to estimation period, 
the uncorrected (biased) test statistic will be very close to the corrected (unbiased) 
one. But when event period is relatively large, the bias is substantial. 
Problem 4 is the event-induced heteroskedasticity. Patell (1976) points out 
that prediction errors have greater variance than the regression disturbances since 
prediction errors are a function of estimator errors in the parameters as well as 
disturbance variance. Similarly, since the event day return is a Sanction of the 
random shock in the announcement as well as the other firm specific shocks affecting 
the security, the abnormal return estimator will likely have a greater variance during 
the event period. 
Boehmer, Musumeci and Poulsen (1991) suggest a simple solution. The 
abnormal return estimates are first standardized by their estimated standard deviation 
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(assuming no event induce heteroskedasticity), based on the residual variance from 
the estimation period and the fact that they are prediction errors. Next the standard 
deviation of these standardized variates is calculated cross sectionally in the event 
period and the significance of the estimate of the average standardized abnormal 
return is tested using the cross sectionally estimated standard deviation. In effect, this 
method assumes that the event-induced increase in variance is proportional for each 
firm. They find in simulations that with this method the frequency of rejection of the 
null is essentially equal to the nominal size of the test when the null hypothesis of no 
abnormal performance is true. When the null is false, their method rejects the null 
more often than the other methods for which the true size of the test is equal to the 
nominal size. That is, their test is unbiased and more powerful than other well 
specified alternatives. 
In summary, when event periods are not clustering, Brown and Warner 
(1980) prove that cross sectional dependence will be a minor problem. Chandra, 
Moriarty and Willinger (1990) find that the cross sectional dependence is still minor 
even in a clustering condition but when securities are randomly chosen from 
different industries. Moreover, when the event period is short, relative to the 
estimation period, time series dependence will be unimportant. 
3.2.4 A multivariate regression model (MVRM) employed in the event study 
Rather than modeling abnormal returns as prediction errors from the market 
model equation, the sample period can be extended to contain the event period and a 
zero-one dummy variable Dt can be included in the return equation: 
代， 
The coefficient 丫，is the abnormal return for security i during period t and is 
directly estimated in regression. This approach parameterizes the abnormal return in 
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the market model regression equation. Alternatively, on one dummy variable that 
equals one during each event period could be used when there are multiple events. In 
this case, the coefficient on the dummy variable measures the average abnormal 
return for firm across all the event periods. Also, the model above could be extended 
in several ways. For, example, the CAPM could be used as the benchmark rather 
than the market model or the market model could be extended to control for the 
January effect in security and to allow the beta and alpha to change because of the 
event. 
Gibbons (1980) suggests that the model could easily be expanded to the 
multiple events by introducing different dummy variable. Further, the model allows 
the coefficients to differ across companies. 
The coefficient estimates and their standard errors of the multivariate 
regression model (MVRM) are the same as those obtained using ordinary least 
squares to estimate each individual equation. Therefore, there is no efficiency gain 
from using MVRM. However, tests of hypotheses in this framework about the 
abnormal returns employ an estimate of the variance — a covariance matrix of the 
disturbances, hence they explicitly control from the contemporaneous correlation and 
heteroskedasticity problems. Also, the fact that the abnormal return estimators are 
not independent is controlled from in statistical tests in a regression framework, since 
the tests incorporate the covariance among the estimators when more than one 
abnormal return is involved. Similarly, the fact that the abnormal return estimators 
are more like prediction errors than residuals is explicitly recognized in the 
calculation of their standard errors. 
Thus, a number of the statistical problems that are of concern in the standard 
event study methodology are solved directly in the regression framework as long as 
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the disturbances in each equation have the properties assumed in ordinary least 
squares or multivariate regression. However, these problems can also be solved fairly 
easily when abnormal returns are measured as prediction errors in the simple market 
model. Therefore, the real advantage of the MVRM framework over the standard 
methodology lies in its ability to allow the abnormal returns to differ across 
companies, including in sign and to easily test joint hypotheses about the abnormal 
returns. The MVRM framework has primarily been used to examine regulatory 
changes. 
3.2.5 Measuring long horizon security price performance 
Long horizon event studies involve many related considerations that do not 
arise or are less important with short horizon. Brown and Warner (1980) suggest that 
a long horizon event study test will have low power. Kothari and Warner (1997) 
show that in 34.8% of samples of 200 securities, procedures based on Fama and 
French three facto model, abnormal performance over a 36 month horizon occurs， 
using two tailed parametric tests at the 5% significance level. Moreover, the results 
are similar when other procedures are used and the general conclusions are not 
sensitive to the specific performance benchmarks. The tests can prove that both 
positive and negative abnormal performance too often. Further, the abnormal 
performance persists throughout the horizon following a simulated event. This 
phenomena raise the possibility that previous findings are due to test misspecification 
rather than misspricing. Kothari and Brown (1990) identify multiple sources of test 
misspecification, and the joint effect is that parametric test statistics do not satisfy the 
assumed zero mean and unit normality assumptions. The bias toward over rejection 
is related to both sample selection and survival since the standard variance estimation 
methods underestimate the true variance and the required prior return data (pre-event 
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survival) can cause estimated past event abnormal returns to be systematically 
positive in random samples. 
The main concern in improving the measurement is to use a better test 
statistic. A nonparmeteric procedure such as bootstraps in Barber and Lyon (1996), 
seems like a promising framework for alternative tests which can potentially reduce 
misspecification and will thus enhance the reliability of inference from long horizon 
studies. 
3.2.6 Use daily return or monthly return in event study? 
Brown and Warner (1980) investigate event study methodologies used with 
monthly returns. They conclude that a simple market model is both well specified 
and relatively powerful under a wide variety of conditions, and that in special cases 
even simpler methods, such as mean adjusted return, also perform well. However, 
daily and monthly returns differ in potentially important respects, including the daily 
return's non-normality, non-synchronous trading, and variances, cross sectional and 
time series dependence. Non-synchronous trading will cause biases in estimation of 
the market model. Brown and Warner (1985) show that non-normality and biases in 
estimating the market model are unimportant in tests for abnormal performance. 
Chandra, Moriarty and Willinger (1990) find that the cross sectional dependence is 
still minor even in a clustering condition but when securities are randomly chosen 
from different industries. Moreover, when the event period is short, relative to the 
estimation period, time series dependence will be unimportant. Thus, the use of daily 
or monthly return depends on the needs of the research. The long horizon abnormal 
returns employ monthly data, but the daily return is convenient for obtaining the 
short horizon abnormal returns. 
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Chapter 4 Are H Shares Wanted: Dead or Alive? 
Event studies and regression analysis of H shares will disclose how the 
investors do their own investments on H shares. Further, the empirical results are the 
basis for my suggestions on reforming H shares. I have conducted seven kinds of 
event studies on H shares. They are 1) good earnings announcements，2) bad 
earnings announcements, 3) good news, 4) bad news, 5) merger & acquisition, 6) 
seasonal equity offerings and 7) new projects. This fine categorization is usefial to 
avoid any interdependence among events, and clarify both the cause and its specific 
effects. Consequently, empirical results will be more reliable. 
4.1 Definitions of Events 
Good earnings announcements are defined as when H share interim or annual 
earnings rise by at least 10% over the same period of the previous year. Since no 
authoritative earnings' forecasting of H shares is available, the definition is useful for 
investigating the market response to good earnings announcements. In fact, 10% is a 
good benchmark to distinguish good earnings from average and bad earnings. 
Similarly, I define bad earnings as those over 20% less than that over the same 
period of the previous year. Since most H shares decreased in sales after the Asian 
economic crises in 1997, they have lower earnings. I set the relatively high 20% as a 
hurdle rate to represent those companies whose earnings would be worse than 
anticipated if their earnings went down by over 20%. 
H share news are cited from main newspapers, including the Hong Kong 
Economic Newspaper, the South China Morning Post, the Hong Kong Standard, 
Reuters and the Financial Times. Zhu Rongji has taken series of measures to develop 
economy more rapidly since he assumed the Prime Minister in 1997. For instance, he 
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campaigned against smuggling which had a positive impact on specific industries. 
When smuggling was contained, steel and oil prices rebounded. Second, the central 
government restricted price competition among airlines. Finally, some encouraging 
reports on individual H shares appeared in main newspapers. I define these reports as 
good news for the specific firm. I aim to investigate whether the market was sensitive 
to news on H shares. In contrast, when very negative news appeared, I consider this 
report as bad news. 
Only two of H shares issued seasonal equity offerings after their IPOs in the 
Hong Kong market. From this it can be inferred that H shares are not welcomed in 
the marketplace. At the same time, some H shares issued A shares in the mainland 
stock markets after their IPOs in Hong Kong. I consider this kind of fund raising as 
seasonal equity offerings since they have commonplaces in increasing outstanding 
shares and financing new investments. Merger & Acquisition is the kind of 
investment plan written in the prospectus of H shares. H shares raised funds from 
IPOs to acquire associated assets from their parent companies. But some of the 
declared merger & acquisition did not take place because those companies no longer 
thought M&A would be profitable. So, research on market responses to M&A will 
disclose the market's confidence on H shares' fidelity to their promises made in the 
prospectus. 
New projects are distinguished from seasonal equity offerings and M&A in 
that they are not disclosed in the previous prospectus, and they must be different 
form the firm's current business. So, the business lines of H shares are diversified by 
new projects. Did the market welcome these new investments? This question will 
be answered later. 
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4.2 Sample and Estimation Procedures 
4.2.1 Sample Selection 
The sample includes 42 H shares publicly traded in the Hong Kong stock 
market from 1993 to 1999. The daily price files with the adjusted HSI and HSCEI 
were downloaded from Data Stream. Further, daily prices have been adjusted with 
past earnings. Also, I downloaded financial statements from the Financial Times, and 
upgraded or corrected them with information from their latest annual reports. 
H share news that appeared in Hong Kong Economic Daily, the Standard, 
South China Morning Post and Reuters were printed out. In order to locate accurate 
event dates of good earnings announcements, bad earnings announcements, good 
news，bad news, seasonal equity offerings, M & A and new projects, I have checked 
and classified them thoroughly and carefully. 
4.2.2 Estimation Procedures 
I use the market index model and the constant-mean-return model to calculate 
the normal return. According to Brown and Warner (1980), the market index model 
is good enough because other models cannot signifcantly enhance the forcasting 
power, and the constant-mean-return model is not as powerful as the market index 
model. But the constant-mean-return model is efficient. In some cases, it is better 
than the market index model. The market indexes include the HSI, which represents 
the overall level of the Hong Kong stock market, and the HSCEI, which consists of „ 
42 H shares. 
The abnormal return is the ex post return minus the normal return computed 
by the market index model or the constant-mean-retum model. Further, the 
cumlative abnormal return (CAR) is the summation of the abnormal returns from the 
first day of event window to the current day. 
-••'•',. :. .... . 
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When I conduct long term event studies on earnings announcements, the 
norml return is "buy and hold" return according to the market index model. The 
abnormal return is the buy and hold ex post return minus the buy-and-hold ex ante 
return according to the market index model. 
The estimation window is from 90 days to 21 days before the event date, 
Li=10. The relatively short estimation window regards is chosed to avoid the 
clustering of events. And the event window is from 20 days before the event date to 
20 days after the event day, 12=40. But when I investigate the long term post 
earnings announcement drift, the event window is enlonged to 239 days after the 
event day, which amounts to one year. 
4.3 Empirical Results of Good and Bad Earnings Announcements 
4.3.1 Short Term Effects on Securities Prices 
Table 4.1 presents abnormal returns that average across 42 H shares as well 
as the averged cumulative abnormal return for each of the good and bad earnings. 
Two normal return models are considered and compared: the market model and, the 
constant-mean-return model. Plots of the daily abnormal return are included, with 
the daily abnormal return from the HSI model in Figure 4.1a and the daily abnormal 
return from the constant-mean-return model in Figure 4.1b. Plots of the cumulative 
abnormal returns are also included ,with the CARs from the market model in Figure 
4.2a and the CARs from the constant-mean-return model in Figure 4.2b. 
As shown in Figure 4.1a and Figure 4.1b, also presented in Table 4.1，when 
earnings are just announced, the average daily abnormal return for good earnings is -
3.2% from the market model and -3 .8% from the constant-mean-retum model. Since 
the standard error of the one-day good earnings average abnormal return is 0.4% 
from the market model and 0.5% from the constant-mean-retum model, the value of 
> - i f � - • 
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^-statistic is - 8 and -7 ,6 . so，in the two models, the null hypothesis that the event has 
no effect is strongly rejected. The negative effect on good earnings announcement 
day is due to early inside information leaking. It is seen in Figure 4.1a and Figure 
4.1b that in the market，the profit-takers push down the price on the event day, but 
the price recovers from the second day on. On the other hand，the average daily 
abnormal returns for bad earnings are 0.8% from the market model and 1.3% from 
the constant-mean-return model on the event announcement day. Since the standard 
errors are 0.6% from the market model and 0.4% from the constant-mean-retums 
models，the value of ^stastic is 1.3 and 3.25. Thus, they do not consistantly reject the 
null hypothesis. 
Table 4.1 shows that 20 day's CAR for good earnings are 13.1% and 7.9% , 
and more than 6.8% and 7.3% CARs for bad earnings. But empirical results do not 
appear to be consistent with the prior expectation on the information content of 
earnings in that the average daily abnormal return for good earnings are significantly 
negative. It would appear that the leaking of inside information can explain this. 
From Figure 4.2a and Figure 4.2b，CARs on —1 day is 9.3% in the market model 
and 6.8% in the constant-mean-return model. In comparison with 1.2% in the market 
model and 2.2% in the constant-mean-mo del for bad eaninings, high CARs for good 
eanings could indicate the leaking of information before formal announcements. In 
Table 4.1, the difference between CARs of good earnings announcements and bad 
earnings announcements is 0.096, /-statistic is -2.41. So , the inside information 
was leaked 10 days ahead of the event. 
However, whether the null hypothesis for bad earnings should be rejected is 
unknown. And if I replace the HSI with the Hang Seng China Enterprises Index 
(HSCEI), How does this alter the average daily abnormal return on the event day? 
.赛 
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Table 4.2 presents the average daily abormal returns and CARs in the market 
model using the HSI or HSCEI for good and bad earnings announcements. Figure 4.3 
plots the average daily abnormal returns in the HSCEI market model. Figure 4.4 
plots CARs in the HSCEI model. 
In Table 4.2，the average daily abnormal return from the HSCEI model for 
bad earnings on the event day is 0.2%, and its one day standard error is 0.4%. so, the 
value of ^-statistic is 0.5. therefore, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. Therefore, 
bad earnings announcments have no effect on H shares because the market has 
accurately predicted bad earnings. When the HSI is replaced by the HSCEI, the 
average daily abnormal return is dramatically reduced from 0.8% to 0.2% on the 
event day. Hence, the indvidual H share was brought down by the entire H share 
index. In short, H shares have an overall impression in the market. When bad 
earnings announcements appear, at most the market has unconsistent responses to 
the whole H shares, but it does not respond to the specfic H share which announced 
the bad figures . 
Likewise, even after the HSI is replaced by the HSCEI, the story is the same 
for H shares with good earnings. Further, the average daily abnormal returns on the 
event day are very close. Therefore, good earnings announcements do have an effect 
of positive cumulative abnormal returns. 
According to Kothari and Warner (1997), suppose CDAR20 is cumulative ,, 
daily abnormal return from event day to the 19the day，for good earnings 
announcements, it is 0.04 and /-stastitic is 2.23. In contrast, for bad earnings 
announcements, it is 0.044 and 广stastitic is 1.63. Thus, good earnings 
annnouncements bring in an significant positive effect, while bad earnings 
announcments cause a positive impact but it is not statistically different from zero. 
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4.3.2 Long Term Post-Earnings-Announcement Drifts 
I measure long horizon security price performances for good and bad 
earnings. Since H shares do not have many monthly returns, daily returns are used. 
The period is 240 days from 0 days to 239 days. The length presents one year. So， 
the investigation researches the price drift within a year. The cumulative average 
daily abnormal return (CAR) is to average the individual's cumulative daily 
abnormal returns. And the individual daily abnormal return is the real return from the 
event day to the current time minus the expected return according to the market 
model for the same period. The market index is HSI or HSCEI. 
Figure 4.5a and Figure 4.5b delineate buy and hold CARs in the market 
model of the HSI and the HSCEI. They plot both good and bad earnings 
announcement drifts from the event day to 239 days later. 
From Figure 4.5a and Figure 4.5b, it can be seen that bad earnings 
announcement drifts are much worse than good earnings announcement drifts. The 
CAR for bad earnings is -90% in one year. In contrast, for good earnings, the CAR 
is -50%. However, within a 20 day event period, their differences are narrow. From 
40 days on, their differences expanded rapidly. 
If we compare figure 4.5a with figure 4.5b, we find that using the HSI model, 
negative CARs of good earings are exaggerated. Figure 1.1 presents buy and hold 
returns of the HSI and the HSCEI.The cumulative return of the HSI from 7/15/93 to 
7/15/99 is well above that of the HSCEI. CARs are found negative in both good and 
bad earnings announcement. A possible explaination of the fact is that the beta is 
postively biased. In order to smooth the handover of Hong Kong to China, the 
Chinese governament executed a policy to support H shares before July 1997. After 
that，H shares went down more rapidly than the overall market, the estimated beta 
• ： yr^ 
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over the the early time is posititvely biased. As the result of this fact，the cumulative 
abnormal return is less than it should be. As time passes, the bias enlarges. So, after 
60 days, CAR decreases at an accelerating speed and that is the reason why the 
negative CAR of good earnings are exagerated according to the HSI model. 
However, because the market has a very good predicability of bad performance, a 
similar situation does not occur to the CAR of bad earnings 
In short, good and bad earnings announcements have different long term 
effects on H share prices. While good earings do not have very positive effects, H 
shares with bad earnings defintely experience significant long term deterioration. 
4.3.3 Regression Analysis 
The analysis is used to obtain regression relations between abnormal returns 
and sepcific firm characteristics. 
I use a dependent variable CAR(0,1), which presents the sum of cumulative 
average daily abnormal returns on 0 day and 1 day. While good earnings drifts are 
shown to be significant during those two days, bad earnings announcments have no 
effect. The market sentiments on H shares were pemmisistic. 
The regressioal results are presented in Table 4.3, Table 4.4a and Table 4.4b. 
In order to improve the efficiency of the analysis, I keep only one of the events 
which has the same event day. Moreover, some of H shares announced very 
dissapointing losses in their interim reports, and they continued to report losses in 
their annual reports. Since bad results should be correctly predicted by the market 
and they will have not brought in any additional effects, I deleted the subsequent 
events. Table 4.4b shows improved results. 
The variables include past return, size, sales growth，ROA, ROE growth and 
industry dummy variables. The industries involve raw materials, consumer products, 
35 
manufacturing and transportation. 
Past return is the return from - 2 0 days to - 1 day. If good earnings 
information is leaked in advance, then past return will，consequently, be larger than 
expected. It is less possible that past return is significantly correlated with CAR(0，1). 
For good earnings announcements, if a high past return is accompanied with a large 
CAR(0，1), it means that rising mometum is continuing. The past return coefFiciency 
also indicates the effectiveness of momentum strategy or contrarian strategy. The 
variable of past return is very important to filter the trading noise even if it is not 
correlated with CAR(0,1), and helps to locate the determinant factor to affect the 
stock price movement. 
Size is confirmed by the existing lierature to be an important factor in trading. 
Small stock has a higher return. The relative high return compensate illiquidity of 
the small stock. 
Sales growth is the growth rate of t-1 year's sales over t-2 year's sales. The 
variable is proxy for the market expansion of H shares. Actually, the sales growth is 
associated with the specific industry. For example, suppose that the market is good 
for consumer products, the firm's sales growth will increase even if its management 
does not work so hard. So, we can estimate that the introduction of the industry 
dummy variables will reduce the sales growth effects on the two days' abnormal 
return. 
ROA, return on asset, assesses how efficient the firm utilize and increase the 
assets. If several companies operate in an indentical industry, ROA will become an 
important factor to select the stock. 
ROE growth is the growth rate of t-1 year's return on equity (ROE) over t-2 
year's return on equity. The reason why I don't use EPS as a variable is that in the 
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E M H hypothesis, ROE is easier to be reflexed to the trading price than its growth. To 
illustrate it, the market compares ROEs among the companies and determines 
resonable prices. So the absolute ROE level is already efficiently reflected in the 
stock price. But perhaps its trend, expressed in terms of ROE growth, is not reflected 
so fully as ROE. So，ROE growth is a better indictor to reflect the trend than ROE. 
4.3.3.1 Regression Results for Good Earnings Announcements 
Table 4.3 shows regression results of good earnings announcements. 
CAR(0,1) can be obtained according to the HSI model or the HSCEI model. In the 
first column, ROA and ROE growth coefficients are signifcantly not zero because 
their 广statistic is more than 2. From the second to the fourth column, the results are 
same. Size and sales growth are significant. 
The different industry generate different sales growth. The industry dummies 
reduce the sales growth's roles here. Now, ROA becomes an important benchmark to 
rank H shares inside of a specific industry. Second, ROE growth is also a signifcant 
factor. But its coefficiency is much less than ROA's. Third, ROA coefficiency is 
positive，so the higher ROA means a larger two days' abnormal return. However, the 
negative coefficient of ROE growth means that the higher growth causes the lower 
abnormal return. The result suggests that the market does not accept consective 
ROEs growth. 
From the second to fourth column in table 4.3, we obtain the following , 
results: (l)Size's coefficiency is significantly positive, which means that big sized 
companies have reletivly large two days，abnormal returns. The size advantage 
implies that the big companies are more welcomed by the market when good 
earnings are announced. Since the big firin has a relatively large market share, its 
business is more stable. The good earnings momentum of the big firm will have 
37 
more possibility of being maintained than the small. This is a possible reason why 
size coefFicency is positive. (2) Sales growth's coefficency is significantly negative. 
Since the industry type has implications for the sales growth, when the industry 
dummies are not included the regression their roles disappear, and the sales growth 
becomes a more significant factor than ROA and ROE growth. Why do the HSCEI 
regressions have the same result as the second column? Because H shares are not 
clearly distingstiguished by the industry if we use the HSCEI as the market index. 
The results confirm that the difference among H shares are ignored by the market, 
and H shares are considered as a whole entity by the market. The negative 
coefficency of sales growth means that the high sales growth has the low two days' 
abnormal return. Since the sales growth is the previous year's sales growth, the 
empircal result implies that the market does not have faith in consective four years' 
sales growth. Since H shares are sunset industry shares, the consective four year 
sales growth is impossible in the view of investores. The implication of this industry 
factor convinces me that H shares should go into fast growing businesses. But if the 
firm is big enough in size, the size factor will offset the negative factor of sales 
growth. In fact, since size's logarithm is much larger than the sales growth in the 
term of absolute meanings, the size factor has a stronger effect than sales growth. 
4.3.3.2 Regression Results for Bad Earnings Announcements 
Table 4.4a shows regression results for bad earnings announcements. When 
industry dummies are involved in the analysis, all the factors are not significant. The 
cluster and interindependence are potential causes. 
Table 4.4b shows regression results without clustering and interdependence. 
Both the HSI and the HSCEI regressions have the same results. Further, these results 
� accomodate the results appearing in the first and fourh column in Table 4.4a. (1) 
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Only the sales growth coefficiency is significatly negative. This means that the firm 
with worse sales growth will have more two days' abnormal return just when the bad 
earnings are announced. It also suggests that the market hopes the bad situation will 
bottom out soon since the companies have had three consecutive years' decline in the 
sales growth. That is a contrarian stragety. (2) The reason why the industry types 
have no role here is that bad earnings announcements occur more often than good 
eaningings announcements. Bad earnings announcements have effects on the whole 
H share while good earnings announcements have specific effects on those which 
announce good news. 
4.3.4 Summary 
In sum, this section shows the following results. (1) The good earnings 
annoucment has the significantly postive effect on H shares prices; However, I have 
not found any stastically significant effect due to the bad earnings announcement. 
So, I suggest that the market correctly predicts the bad earnings and only the good 
eanings are real surprises. (2) According to the regressional results of two days' 
daily abnormal return for good earnings, when industry types are involved, ROA 
plays a postive role and ROE growth has the negative effect. When the industry types 
are not involved or in practice, size has the postive effect and sales growth has the 
negative effect. The market does not believe in the consective four years' sales 
growth. Since H shares are located in the sunset industry, consective four year sales 
growth is impossible in the view of investores. The implication of industry factor 
convinces me that H shares should enter fast growing industries. Therefore, the 
responses to the good news are very seletive and sepecific. (3) However, with regard 
to regressional results of two days' average daily abnormal return for bad earnings, 
no matter what industry types are involved, only sales growth plays negative role. 
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After the decline of the consecutive three year sales, the market hopes the eventual 
bottoming out of H shares. Therefore, H shares are not dead! So, we should not 
abondon any attempt to save H shares. (4) The long horizon price performance is 
dissapointing. But the negative abnormal return is exaggerated due to the postive bias 
of beta because H shares uderperform the whole market. Nevertheless, companies 
with good earnings outperform those with bad earnings in the long term. 
4.4 Empirical Results of Good and Bad News 
Fundamental macroeconomic news are thought to have little effect on stock 
prices. McQueen and Roley (1993) show that after allowing for different stages of 
the business cycle, a stronger relationship between stock prices and news is evident. 
The category of events study investigates whether the market is enthusiatic to news 
of H shares. 
Table 4.5 presents daily abnormal returns and CARs from the HSI model and 
the constant-mean-return model. Figure 4.6a and Figure 4.6b plot the results. From 
Figure 4.6a and Figure 4.6b, it can be seen that CARs for good news are higher than 
CARs for bad news on the 20th day. From the HSI model, ^-statistic for the event 
day are not significant. But from the constant-mean -return model, these ^-statistic 
are sigificant. 
Table 4.6 presents average daily abnormal returns and CARs from the HSI 
model and the HSCEI model. Figure 4.7 plots CARs from the HSCEI model for , 
good news and bad news. CARs for good news are always well above bad 
news,which suggests that the HSCEI model is better at reflecting the general news 
because of less noise than the HSI model. Unfoitunely, ^-statistic for the event day 
are not significant. 
In Table 4.6，the difference between CARs of good news and bad news is 
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0.079，^-statistic is 3.05. so the difference is significant.Further, CDAR20 for good 
news is 0.075，/-statistic is 2.39. In constrast, CDAR20 for bad news is -0.056, t-
statistic is -3.11. Therefore, good news has positive impact and bad news has 
negative impact since the event day. 
In summary, although empirical results do not suggest that good and bad 
news have sinficant effects on H shares, CARs with good news are larger than those 
with bad news. 
4.5 Empirical Results of SEO, M&A and New Projects 
Seasonal equity offerings are used to replenish operational fund or finance 
new investment. Asquith and Mullins (1986) , and Spiess and Graves (1995) show 
the underperformance in short term and long run stock returns following SEOs. Since 
only two of H shares issued SEOs, A shares issuing after H shares' IPOs is counted 
into the catergory. Second, H shares financed M&A with funds raised from IPOs, 
and M&As are scheduled in prospectus to acquire associated assets from H share 
parent company. Finally, new projects are investment out of the firm's main area of 
operation. 
Table 4.7 presents average daily abnormal returns and CARs from the HSI 
model and the constant-mean-return model. Figure 4.8a and Figure 4.8b plot these 
results. From those figures, of the three events, the largest are CARs for new 
projects, then for SEOs, and last for IV1& A. /-statistic for the event day are ‘ 
significant. 
Table 4.8 compares between the HSI model and the HSCEI model. Figure 4.9 
plots CARs from these two models. Figure 4.9 cannot confirm the result obtained 
from Table 4.7. Further，^statistic on the event day are not significant. Since the 
HSCEI is an H share itself，it offsets the event effects when the abnormal return is 
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calculated. 
On Table 4.8，with regard to the HSI model, CDAR20 for new projects is 
0.197, and ^-statistic is 3.67; CDAJI20 for SEOs is 0.056，and ^statistic is 2.51; 
CDAR20 for M & A is 0.024, and /-statistic is 0.76. So, new projects have the largest 
positive impact since the event day. 
4.5.1 Summary 
In summary, new projects have largest postive abnormal returns, and SEOs 
yield higher positive abnormal returns than M&As. The empirical results suggest that 
(1) the market welcomes entry of new businesses most; 
(2) Even if M&As are claimed in the prospectus, the market postively 
responds further to their realization. If we accept that not all the plans are 
realized，the market's positive response can be regarded as a praise to the 
promise. So, H shares should attach importance to fame building; 
(3) the HSI is more suitable to investigate events of SEO, M&A and new 
projects than the HSCEI. This explicitly implies that the individual event 
has an effect on the entire H shares; 
So, the market prefers to consider the individual H share as a whole rather 
than a separate entity. 
// 
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Chapter 5 A Practical Corporate Governance for H Shares 
Chapter four has empirically deinonstrated that H shares are still alive. When 
good earnings are announced publicly or new projects are announced, they positively 
affect H shares prices. Hence, empirical results may persuade the Chinese 
government to reform H shares. Second, when industry dummies are involved in the 
cross-sectional regression analysis, return on assets (ROA) is prominently a positive 
factor associated with abnormal returns to good earnings announcements. So, any 
change in H shares is required to meet a high ROA. Just as the market welcomes new 
projects，H shares are encouraged to enter the fast growing businesses. Therefore, H 
shares should be restructured to utilize more advanced technology and make high-
tech value added products. 
However, even if the government starts reform in that direction, H shares 
cannot reach this goal unless they have good corporate governance. Corporate 
governance is essential for making correct investment decisions by enterprises and 
attracting enough external financing. In theory, H shares are state owned and 
controlled by the public. State ownership is an example of concentrated control with 
no cash flow rights. Viewed from this perspective，the inefficiency of state 
companies is not surprising at all. While most advanced market economies have 
solved the problem of corporate governance at least partially, in that they have 
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assured the flows of enormous amounts of capital to companies，and actual 
repatriation of profits to the investors, there is practically no corporate governance 
concept and mechanisms in China. The most welcomed and long awaited innovation 
should be the rapid establishment of good corporate governance in H shares. The 
fundamental progress will lessen the worsening inefficiency and curb the huge costs 
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of the agency problem. Therefore, this chapter aims to discuss corporate governance 
and design for a good transitional framework to restructure H shares. 
According to Barca (1995), Italian corporate governance mechanisms are so 
under-developed that they substantially retard the flow of external capital to 
companies. That is the same reason why only additional three seasonal issues in 42-
H shares have been made since 1993. Inefficiency and non-transparency in 
investment decision have also discouraged financiers. Therefore, a change is needed 
immediately. Corporate governance mechanisms are economic and legal institutions. 
The reform of corporate governance will spur political worries. Since the market 
competition cannot solve the entire problem of corporate governance, new 
mechanisms require the intervention of political forces. The recognition of the 
enormous inefficiency of state companies, and the pressures they impose on public 
budgets, have created a common response around the world in the last few years, 
namely privatization. In most cases, privatization replaces political control with 
private control by outside investors. The main content of the change in H shares 
seems to be privatization of state companies. However, the privatization can not 
address all the problems and may have some dangerous side effects. 
The cases where privatization does not work as well as intended can be 
understood from the corporate governance perspective. At the same time，the 
problems of managerial discretion in these companies are maybe nearly as serious as 
the prior problems of political control. Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny (1995) give a 
Russian example of post-privatization difficulties with corporate governance. For 
political reasons，the Russian privatization has led to controlling ownership by the 
management of many companies. However’ there are two problems. First, the virtual 
absence of protection of minority shareholders makes it attractive for managers to 
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divert resources from the companies despite their large personal cash flow stakes, 
since in this way they do not need to share with outside investors at all. Second, 
managers in many cases are not competent to restructure the privatized companies, 
yet in virtue of their control rights they remain on the job and derive the benefits of 
control. In fact, some of the most successful privatization cases in Russia have been 
the ones where outside investors have accumulated enough shares to either replace or 
otherwise control the management. 
Therefore, mass privatization in China is not realistic and at the best, it should 
be implemented cautiously. Before a feasible framework of good corporate 
governance is designed, it is necessary to discuss some findings. Section 5.1 
discusses the agency problems and management discretion. The huge cost as a result 
of those problems gives no excuse to shun from the fundamental reforms of H 
shares. Section 5.2 reviews main the solutions to the problems and investigates their 
strengths and weakness. Section 5.3 discusses the specific situation for H shares and 
provides a practical framework of good corporate governance. 
5.1 Problems Corporate Governance Deals with 
5.1.1 The Agency Problem 
In principle, the financiers giv e funds to the manager on the condition that 
they retain all the residual control rights. In any time something unexpected happens, 
financiers get to decide what to do But this does not quite work, for the simple 
reason that the financiers are not qualified or informed enough to decide what to do -
the very reason they hired the niaiiauer in the first place. As a consequence, the 
manager ends up with substantial residual control rights and therefore discretion to 
allocate funds as he chooses. There may be limits on this discretion specified in the 
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contract - and much of corporate governance deals with these limits, but the fact is 
that managers do have most of the residual control rights. 
5.1.2 Management Discretion 
Managers end up with significant control rights (discretion) over how to 
allocate investors' funds. To begin, they can expropriate them. In many pyramid 
schemes, for example, the organizers end up absconding with the money. Managerial 
expropriation of funds can also take more elaborate forms than just taking the cash 
out, such as transfer pricing. In the Russian oil industry, such sales of oil to manager-
owned trading companies (which often do not even pay for the oil) are evidently 
common. An even more dramatic alternative is to sell the assets, and not just the 
output, of the company to other manager-owned businesses at below market prices. 
Finally, and perhaps most important, managers can expropriate shareholders 
by entrenching themselves and staying on the job even if they are no longer 
competent or qualified to run the firm. Poor managers who resist being replaced 
might be the costliest manifestation of the agency problem. Managerial opportunism, 
whether in the form of expropriation of investors or of misallocation of company 
funds, reduces the amount of resources that investors are willing to put up ex ante to 
finance the firm. 
5.2 Solutions to the Problems 
5.2.1 Incentive Contracts 
A solution is to grant a manager a highly contingent, long-term incentive 
contract ex ante to align his interests with those of investors. While m some future 
the marginal value of the personal benefits of control may exceed the marginal value 
of the manager's contingent compensation, such instances will be relatively rare if 
the incentive component of pay is substantial. In this way, incentive contracts can 
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induce the manager to act in investors' interest without encouraging blackmail, 
although such contracts may be expensive, the personal benefits of control are high ‘ ��� 
and there is a lower bound on the manager's compensation in the bad states of the 
world. Incentive contracts can take a variety of forms, including share ownership， 
stock options, or threats of dismissal if income is low. The optimal incentive contract 
is determined by the manager's risk aversion, the importance of his decisions, and his 
ability to pay for the cash flow ownership up front. 
Incentive contracts are indeed common in practice. However, The more 
serious problem with high-powered incentive contracts is that they create enormous 
opportunities for self-dealing for the managers, especially if these contracts are 
negotiated with poorly motivated boards of directors rather than with large investors. 
Managers may negotiate for themselves such contracts when they know that earnings 
or stock price are likely to rise, or even manipulate accounting numbers and 
investment policy to increase their pay For example, Yermack (1997) finds that 
managers receive stock option grants shortly before good news announcements and 
delay such grants until after bad news announcements. His results suggest that 
options are often not so much an incentive device as a somewhat covert mechanism 
of self-dealing. 
5.2.2 Large Investors 
There are two main forms of large investors: large shareholders and large 
creditors. 
Large Shareholders 
The most direct way to align cash flow and control rights of outside investors 
is to concentrate share holdings. This can mean that one or several investors in the 
firm have substantial minority ownership stakes, such as 10 or 20 percent. A 
47 
substantial minority shareholder has the incentive to collect information and monitor 
the management, thereby avoiding the traditional free rider problem. He also has 
enough voting control to put pressure on the management in some cases, or perhaps 
even to oust the management through a proxy fight or a takeover. In the more 
extreme cases, large shareholders have outright control of the companies and their 
management with 51 or more percent ownership. Large shareholders thus address the 
agency problem in that they both have a general interest in profit maximization, and 
enough control over the assets of the firm to have their interests respected. 
Because large shareholders govern by exercising their voting rights, their 
power depends on the degree of legal protection of their votes. However, this may 
require fairly little enforcement by courts, since 51 percent ownership is relatively 
easy to prove, and a vote count is not required once the majority shareholder 
expresses his preferences. With large minority shareholders matters are more 
complicated, since they need to make alliances with other investors to exercise 
control. The power of the managers to interfere in these alliances is greatly enhanced， 
and the burden on courts to protect large shareholder rights is much greater. For this 
reason, large minority share holdings nuiv be effective only in countries with 
relatively sophisticated legal systems, whereas countries where courts are really 
weak are more likely to have outright majority ownership. 
Large Creditors 
Significant creditors, such as banks, are also large and potentially active 
investors. Like the large shareholders, they have large investments in the firm, and 
want to see the returns on their investments materialize. As a result of having a 
whole range of controls, large creditors a mbine substantial cash flow rights with the 
ability to interfere in the major decisions of the fmn. Moreover, in many countries, 
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banks end up holding equity as well as debt of the companies they invest in, or 
alternatively vote the equity of other investors. As a result, banks and other large 
creditors are in many ways similar to the large shareholders. 
The principal advantage of large investors (except in takeovers) is that they 
rely on relatively simple legal interventions, which are suitable for even poorly in-
formed and motivated courts. Large investors put a lighter burden on the legal 
system than the small investors might if they tried to enforce their rights. For this 
reason, perhaps, large investors are so prevalent in most countries in the world. 
5.2.3 Debt Choice 
Debt is a contract that gives the creditor the right to repossess collateral in 
case of default. The defining feature of debt is the ability of creditors to exercise 
control. The borrower can abscond with the profits of the firm. However, if the 
lender is not repaid, he has the right to investigate the books of the firm, and grab its 
cash before the borrower can steal it. Thus failure to repay triggers the transfer of 
control over the assets from the borrower to the lender. Gale and Hellwig (1985) 
show that the optimal contract that minimizes the expected investigation costs is a 
debt contract. In particular, default enaoies creditors to deprive the manager of the 
benefits of control. Moreover, they argue that this adverse selection problem is 
minimized by the issuance of the "safest'' security, i.e., the security whose pricing is 
least sensitive to the manager's private information. Thus highly rated debt with a 
fairly certain payoff stream is issued before equity, since equity is difficult to price 
without knowing the precise value of the firm's assets in place and future growth 
opportunities. Debt is particularly easy to value where there is abundant collateral, so 
that investors need only concern themselves with the value of the collateral and not 
with the valuation of the entire firm, as equity investors would need to. 
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The benefit is usually the reduction in the agency cost, such as preventing the 
manager from investing in negative net present value projects, or forcing him to sell 
assets that are worth more in alternative use. The main costs of debt are that 
companies may be prevented from undertaking good projects because debt covenants 
keep them from raising additional funds, or else they may be forced by creditors to 
liquidate when it is not efficient to do so. Liquidations might be particularly costly 
when alternative use of the asset is iimil ed or when the potential buyers of the asset 
cannot raise funds themselves. 
Unlike equity, debt in a peculiar way may be tougher when it is not concen-
trated if a borrower defaults on debt held by a large number of creditors, 
renegotiating with these creditors may be extremely difficult, and the borrower might 
be forced into bankruptcy. In contrast, it in ay be easier to renegotiate with a bank. 
The difficulty of renegotiations, and the power of dispersed creditors, might explain 
why public debt is an extremely uncommon financing instrument, used only in a few 
developed countries, and even there much less than bank debt. 
5.3 Corporate Governance for H Shares: A Practical Framework 
Family and state owned companies evidently receive less external financing 
than those with good corporate governance. In fact, H shares have raised substantial 
equity finance. Who are the financiers? If they are individual shareholders, why do 
they invest in the absence of minority protections? 
One possible explanation is that, during a period of rapid economic 
expansion, investors count on reputation in the short run. Also, in some rapidly 
growing countries, the rates of return on investment may exceed the rates of 
appropriation by the insiders. Another possibility is that speculative bubbles and 
over-optimism play an important role in equity financing. However, they do not 
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explain why H shares are overly subscribed? 
Some of the H shares companies issue Hong Kong Dollar denominated B 
shares in the mainland market. They have to report annual earnings under two 
different accounting standards, one of which is the People's Republic of China 
Accounting Standards (PRC- GAAP) and one of which is the International 
Accounting Standards (IAS). In-Mu Haw, Daqing Qi and Woody Wu (1998) 
investigate the returns associated with PRC-GAAP and IAS. They find that the return 
is more significantly related with PRC-GAAP than IAS. Their results imply 
explicitly that Chinese companies operating in Hong Kong were major investors of H 
shares. In fact, in 1997 when Hong Kong was being handed over to China, those 
companies were forced to buy H shares. Obviously, the purchase was fiieled by 
political motivations. It is not surprising that when the political forces disappear, 
some IPOs of H shares were so under-subscribed that they had to withdraw the 
listing applications. � 
Economic reform is being rapidly implemented in China. H shares have lost 
the potential privilege from the central government. So，it is now the time to establish 
good corporate governance and guarantee interests of financier. Otherwise, H shares 
cannot be supplied with enough external • funds nor do they make any new 
investments. 
5.3.1 Essential Elements of Good Corporate Governance 
Legal protection of investor rights is an essential element of corporate 
governance. Concentrated ownership is also a near universal method of control that 
helps investors to get their money back. Large investors appear to be necessary to 
force managers to distribute profits. These investors require at least some basic legal 
rights，such as voting rights or the power to pull collateral, to exercise their power 
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over the management. If small investors are to be attracted to the business of 
financing companies, they require some legal protection against expropriation by 
both the managers and the large investors. Therefore, the legal protection of 
investors, as well as some form of concentrated ownership, is an essential element of 
a good corporate governance system. Legal protection and large investors are 
complementary in an effective corporate governance system. Successful corporate 
governance systems, such as those of the United States Germany，and Japan, 
combine significant legal protection of at least some investors with an important role 
for large investors. 
What types of large investors are best? Advocates of the German and 
Japanese corporate governance system point to the benefits of permanent long term 
investors relative to those of takeovers. Hoshi, Kashyap，and Scharfstein (1990) 
show that companies with a main banking relationship in Japan go through financial 
distress with less economic distress and better access to financing. 
On the other hand, there are serious questions about the effectiveness of these 
permanent large shareholders and banks, largely because their toughness is in doubt. 
There is little evidence from either Japan or Germany that banks are very tough in 
corporate governance. At general meetings in the late 80s and early 90s, German 
banks with high voting rights had no incentive to discipline managers, and some 
incentive to cater to them to get more business, as long as the firm is far away from 
default. German banks are not nearly as active in corporate governance as might be 
expected given their lending power and control over equity votes. Second, at least in 
Germany, a large-investor-orienteci governance system discourages small investors 
from participating in financial markets. Finally, it has also been argued that German 
and Japanese banks earn rents from their control over industrial companies，and 
. . . . , • • • 
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therefore effectively benefit themselves at the expense of other investors，controlling 
for other factors, Japanese companies with main banks pay higher average interest 
� \ 
rates on their liabilities than do unaffiliated companies. When regulatory change 
enabled Japanese companies to borrow in public capital markets and not just from 
the banks, high net worth companies jumped at the opportunity. This evidence 
suggests that, for these companies, the costs of bank finance exceeded its benefits. It 
is not surprised to see political and economic pressures for the three systems to move 
toward each other, as exemplified by the growing popularity of large shareholders in 
the United States, the emergence of public debt markets in Japan，and the increasing 
criticizing of banks in Germany. 
5.3.2 Summary: A Practical Framework of Good Corporate Governance 
The market-oriented reform is at the final phase. The core is to restructure the 
ownership of the state enterprises. The inefficiency of state companies is mainly 
attributable to the huge cost of agency problem. The management team or several 
top mangers control the companies. In contrast, the shareholder (namely the state) is 
so soft or corrupted that it has no motivation to execute supervision. As the result，the 
manager often diverts the assets. A good corporate governance system is an 
immediate requirement. Further, good corporate governance involves building up a 
complete, efficient capital and money market. The progress to good corporate 
governance requires political intervention Any reform will be unlikely without „ 
political forces. 
The practical framework of a good corpor ate governance of H shares includes 
several elements: at least two large i(^ng-tcmi shareholders with specific limits, a 
principal creditor or bank, the mandatory subordinate debt financing and incentive 
contracts associated with the excess stock return rather than the profit figure. 
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(1) Jurisdiction in China is very poor and its reform lags far behind the 
economic progress. Thus, minority shareholders receive little protection due to the 
lack of law enforcement and efficient courts. The large shareholder is the only 
practical restraint to prevent the management from expropriating the assets or 
abusing its management discretion. 
What type of large shareholder is the best? The potential large shareholders 
should at least keep their stock for a set period, e.g. two years. And if they sell their 
shares, they must book in the stock exchange and make a public announcement 
ahead of the sale. Second, there should be at least two large shareholders and they 
should not be not dependent on each other. This specification avoids outright 
domination of only one large shareholder and maintains democracy in decisions on 
important issues. Third, the ownership of the individual shareholder should not 
exceed a set percentage, e.g. 20%. According to empirical studies, profitability rises 
in the range of ownership between 0 and 5 percent and falls afterwards. One 
interpretation of this finding is that a large shareholder at first reduces agency costs. 
However, as ownership gets beyond a certain point, the large owners gain almost fiill 
control and are wealthy enough to prefer to use companies to generate private 
benefits of control that are not shared by minority shareholders. This necessitates a 
restriction on the degree of ownership. However, the measure should not be 
applicable if one large shareholder makes a tender offering to the entire minority 
shareholder. Finally, where do the large shareholders come from? According to Stijin 
Clasessens (1997), in the Czech Republic, large shareholders are often bank-
controlled mutual funds. The mass privatization program was implemented through a 
voucher scheme with a distribution of points to citizens followed by competitive 
bidding. The method could lead to diffiise ownership and poor corporate governance. 
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The mutual funds sit on the board and improve the performance in the Czech 
companies. In China, since the commercial bank accumulates huge amounts of non-
performing loans, and the work force is poorly skilled, specialized assets 
management companies, not banks, should manage the mutual funds ideally. Of 
course, private capital should be encouraged to be a large shareholder. In order to 
avoid the high cost of agency problem, the fiuid must be open-ended and managed by 
the private companies. 
(2) Each firm should have its own principal bank, which is the large creditor 
to the firm. The main bank mechanism monitors and improves the cash flow. But it is 
easily ineffective if the preconditions are not met. First，the central bank should set 
up the database of loan performance, which is available to the entire member bank. 
Second, the main bank should publish a report assessing the financial fundamentals 
of the companies at fixed intervals. Finally, a set percentage of loans must 
accompany collateral. According to Raj an and Winto (1995), the collateral produces 
incentives to the bank and monitors the operations. That is the reason why the bank 
cannot keep close watch on the value of collateral and the companies cannot ignore 
spot checks by the bank when its assets are in the control of the bank. 
According to the official figures released by the Chinese central bank, the 
state banks have up to 15 % of bad loans. This is evident in the inefficiency of state 
banks. Private capital is not licensed to do banking in China. Since China is entering 
the WTO, and becoming more open to foreign financial services, private capital 
should be allowed to own or purchase liie bank. The measure to be taken will 
improve the role of the bank as a large cred itor. 
(3) Apar t of external financing must be replenished with public debt. Chinese 
• /• 
culture, like other Asian cultures, e.g. Japanese culture, emphasizes the importance 
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of subversion and cooperation. It Is diflicult to imagine that the representatives of 
large shareholders will prefer to argue than be silent. This soft attitude resulted in the 
eruption of problematic banks in Japan. Since debt supervision is silent but default of 
debt is easily evident in China, automatic monitoring of the cash flow by debt is 
more efficient than that from the shareholder. But action must be taken. First, since 
there is no corporate bond market at present, China should set up a nation-wide debt 
market as soon as possible. Second, China needs the assistance from prominent 
rating agencies in the world. This will help to build up the fairness, justness and 
openness of the market by disclosing professional advice to small investors. Finally, 
freedom of economic news reporting should be guaranteed. Only a few newspapers 
are licensed to publish relevant news all over China. This restriction of the press 
deters information dissemination through monopoly advantage and corruption. If the 
economic news is not easily available, the pricing and monitoring advantage of debt 
over stock will be offset. 
(4) H shares should make an incentive contract with their management. But 
the award is not to be based on the profit figure because this encourages the 
management，s short-term behavior. The profit figure is more easily manipulated than 
the stock excess return in the market. Thus, the incentive contract is to focus on the 
maximization of shareholder's interests. With regard to the reality of H shares, other 
important points are to be included in the contract. First, management salary should 
be raised by a large percentage. In retu门飞，management's employment term should be 
shortened until it is negotiated to anew next time. Second，the separate 
responsibilities of each manager should be clearly defined. H shares should not rely 
on the general manger only. The siibordii.ate managers should be authorized to 
refuse to obey the general manger if he does not abide by the rules. Achieving the 
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right balance is very important in the Chinese culture-working environment. 
In summary, a feasible framework of good corporate governance has been 
presented for H shares. In a transition economy, intervention by the government is 
essential. The government has a key roie to play in establishing efficient courts, 
allowing free economic reports, importing p'-ominent rating agencies, finding large 
shareholders, demanding compulsory principal banking relationship, and building up 
the public debt market. The search for, or the setting up of, large shareholders is 
crucial to the successful reform in China because large shareholders can effectively 
guarantee the safety of the assets. F-urthei, the presence of a large shareholder 
smoothes the process of privatization and indirectly maintains social order and 
stability. Since the individual investor lacks enough funds to be a large shareholder, 
his money will be inducted into the mutual fund ov pension ftind. Therefore, the fund 
industry must also have good corporate uo^ ciiiancr Funds should be open-ended to 
meet the minimum requirements of uood corporate governance. An open-ended 
operation has to report its net asset value to the investor everyday. This compulsory 
disclosure of information will auiomaticalK result in efficient supervision. When the 
fund industry is mature with a laruc numbt” of talents and the law is efficiently 
enforced，mass privatization can he ^liuicl n t!ie form of a campaign. For these 
reasons, I emphasize the role of gtn ei r.nient in ilie transition phase as good corporate 
governance needs political support 
5" 
Chapter 6 Conclusions 
Although H share companies are state owned, chapter two shows that they 
complement a provident financial policy. The financial situations of H shares are 
roughly equal to the average American standard. Their problem, however, is a lack 
of expansive dynamics enabling them to renovate their businesses in face of the 
competitive market. Furthermore, their product markets are shrinking, and they find 
it difficult to provide substantial dividends to their shareholders. H shares are neither 
value stock nor growth stock. Therefore, they are not able to raise external financing 
from the Hong Kong stock market. 
Chapter four is the main part of my thesis. The empirical results I obtained 
suggest that the market correctly predict the loss of H shares without any extra 
responses to bad earnings, but has a very positive reaction to good earnings 
announcement. New projects are welcomed most among the seven studied events. 
With regard to good earnings announcements, a further cross sectional regression 
analysis shows that the two-day abnormal returns are positively correlated with 
return on assets. ROA is a better indicator to invest in stock than ROE growth, so the 
management should make more effort to focus on enhancing the profitability of total 
assets than of equity. Actually, H shares must enter a fast growing industry if they 
are to flourish. 
But problems remain. If H shares do not have good corporate governance, 
substantial improvements will not be maintained. Although complete privatization is 
not immediately possible, it can be complemented progressively by introducing large 
shareholders, large creditors, public debt and incentive contracts. This framework is 
practical in the current environment where there is an absence of jurisdiction 
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efficiency in China. It should work successfully until the precondition of mass 
privatization is met. 
H shares should invest more money into R&D, and move into the fast 
growing businesses. The China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) has 
clearly understood this point. Also, as planned, China Petroleum and Jitong 
Telecommunication will be listed as H shares. According to news in the Hong Kong 
Apple Daily (June 6, 2000), their market capitalization will total up to 800 billion 
HK$ if state shares are considered in the calculation. This addition of new H shares 
will make the Hong Kong Stock Exchange the tenth largest stock market in the 
world. New H shares have a very clear market identity. One of the new H shares is a 
leading telecommunication player and growth stock. The other two are prominent 
manufacturers in the oil industry, have huge market share in China, and are able to 
provide very stable dividends to the shareholders. The ultimate security authority 
seems to have the same ideas as those I suggest in my thesis. 
However, the biggest problem is still how to set up good corporate 
governance. In the practical framework, who can assume the role of the big 
shareholder since the Chinese people are poor? The answer is an open-ended mutual 
fund which can avoid the agency problems. But this is still not enough. Only a 
complete and efficient financial market can guarantee the free flow of capital and 
protect the safety of investors. The CRSC has begun to promote the idea of open-
ended funds and to allow pension funds into the stock market. But it has not fully 
understood how bad management will be if there is no corporate governance. I 
strongly recommend that CRSC start a reform in accordance with my suggested 
framework of good corporate governance. The China Securities Times (July 8, 2000) 
reported that H shares management complained that they could not raise money in 
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the Hong Kong market. In response to these complaints, the CRSC will lift the limit 
on H shares and allow them to list A shares in the mainland market. In order to settle 
their complaints, CRSC allows H share companies to issue shares in the mainland 
stock market. Therefore, CRSC still easily deviate from the right direction of 
reforms. According to the discussions in the thesis, the CRSC should design a good 
plan to dilute the state shares, introduce the large shareholder to establish good 
corporate governance, and force H shares to adjust to the new line of business. 
According to news released on the China Finance Information Network on Sep.25, 
2000, the Chinese government plans to sell state shares to the market from 67.8 % to 
51% as the initial phase and from 51% to 30% as the final phase, and replenish the 
social welfare fund with the income. These plans do not consider a) how to introduce 
the large shareholder and b) how to maintain the sound operation of those companies 
whose state shares will be sold. It is imperative that China avoids the same 
expropriation of assets as occurred in Russia. 
In conclusion, H shares are an integral part of the Hong Kong stock market. 
They should follow the same international standards as the local companies. If they 
can reform to meet the needs of the market, and operate under good corporate 
governance, they can fulfill their potential. 
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Table 1.1 H Shares and Their ROEs in 1998 
^ e Name Return on Shareholder's Equity 
0347 T^ang Newsteel 3A6% 
0914 Anhui Conch — 5.56o/o 
0995 Anhui Expressway 5.79o/o 
0694 liijing Capital Airport N.A. 
0991 Beijing Datang “ 11 -46% 
0588 Beijing N Star — 6.36% 
0325 Beining Yanhua — 2.21 o/o 
0187 Beiren Printing — 4.79% 
0161 Catic Shenzhen 7.79% 
1202Chengdu Telecom O.860/0 
1055 ChTSouthern Airlines -6.69% 
0670 China East Air -7-49% 
1138 China Ship Dev — 0.22% 
1053 Chongqing Iron 2.50% 
1072 Dongfang Elec 3.58% 
0038 First Tractor 5.61% 
092r~ GD Kelon — 17.43% 
0074 Great Wall Tech 一 N.A. 
0525 Guangshen Rail 6.75% 
0317~ Guangzhou Ship 1 -41% 
面4 Guanzhou Phar 
Harbin Power 2.59% 
0902 Huaneng Power 9-24% 
0177 Jiangsu Expressway 5.36% 
0^8 Jiangxi Copper — 0.26% 
036^ Jilin Chemical — 1-09% 
^50 Jingwei Textile 1.0际 
0300 Kunming Machine -4.65% 
'TT08~ Luoyang Glass -25.40% 
032^ Maanshan Iron -1 
0553 Nanjing Panda — -93.44% 
Northeast Elec 0-37% 
"TT22 Qingling Motors 10-43% 
1071 Shangdong Int Power N.A. 
071^ Shangdong Xinhua ~ 6.34% 
^38 Shanghai Pechem 1.91% 
0548 Shenzhen Express 7.75% 
0107 Sichuan Expressway 4.39% 
T06^ Tianjin Bohai — -39.00% 
0168 Tsingtao Brew 1.61% 
TTtI Yanzhou Coal Mining 14.79% 
T033 Yizheng Chem -2.18% 
0576 Zhejiang Express 4.74% 
T128 Izhenhai Refin 7.9TO 
UPDATE:3/1/2000 
Table4.1 abnormal return for an event study of the information content of earnings announcements II 
H ^ Constant-Mean-Return Model  
Event Day Good Earnings Bad Earnings Good Earnings Bad Earnings 
s* CAR ^ c^ C^ CAR 
-0.004 -0.004 0.0060.006 0.001 0.001 
-19 0.014 0.022 -0.001 -0.005 0.008 0.014 0.001 0.002 
-18 0.015 0.037 0.014 0.009 0.013 0.027 0.019 0.020 
-17 0.007 0.043 -0.003 0.006 -0.001 0.026 -0.007 0.014 
-16 0.008 0.052 -0.011 -0.006 0.005 0.031 -0.009 0.004 
-15 0.004 0.056 -0.006 -0.012 0.003 0.033 -0.008 -0.003 
-14 0.001 0.057 0.005 -0.007 -0.005 0.028 0.002 -0.001 
-13 0.002 0.059 -0.008 -0.015 0.001 0.029 -0.011 -0.012 
-12 0.007 0.066 -0.003 -0.018 0.003 0.033 -0.005 -0.016 
-11 0.005 0.071 0.002 -0.016 0.006 0.038 -0.002 -0.018 
-10 0.007 0.078 -0.003 -0.019 0.004 0.043 -0.003 -0.022 
-9 -0.006 0.072 0.007 -0.012 -0.003 0.040 0.004 -0.018 
-8 -0.005 0.067 -0.004 -0.016 -0.004 0.036 0.002 -0.016 
-7 0.005 0.072 -0.002 -0.018 0.007 0.042 -0.001 -0.018 
-6 0.009 0.081 -0.005 -0.024 0.010 0.052 -0.007 -0.024 
-5 -0.001 0.081 0.000 -0.024 0.002 0.054 -0.001 -0.025 
-4 0.020 0.100 0.011 -0.013 0.020 0.075 0.017 -0.008 
-3 -0.005 0.095 0.009 -0.004 -0.005 0.070 0.014 0.006 
-2 0.002 0.097 0.019 0.015 0.005 0.074 0.019 0.024 
-1 -0.005 0.093 -0.003 0.012 -0.006 0.068 -0.002 0.022 
0 -0.032 0.061 0.008 0.020 -0.038 0.030 0.013 0.034 
1 -0.012 0.048 0.024 0.044 -0.016 0.014 0.019 0.053 
2 0.013 0.062 -0.017 0.027 0.010 0.025 -0.016 0.037 
3 0.001 0.063 -0.002 0.025 -0.002 0.022 -0.008 0.029 
4 0.012 0.075 -0.001 0.024 0.016 0.038 -0.006 0.023 
5 -0.009 0.066 0.000 0.024 -0.006 0.032 0.002 0.025 
6 0.007 0.073 -0.002 0.022 0.009 0.041 -0.002 0.023 
7 0.009 0.082 -0.001 0.020 0.009 0.050 -0.009 0.014 
8 0.012 0.093 0.010 0.030 0.011 0.061 0.013 0.027 
9 0.025 0.118 0.004 0.034 0.019 0.079 0.009 0.036 
10 0.023 0.141 0.001 0.035 0.022 0.101 0.006 0.042 
11 -0.008 0.133 -0.001 0.034 -0.008 0.093 0.002 0.045 
12 0.010 0.143 -0.003 0.031 0.008 0.102 0.003 0.048 
13 0 . 0 0 2 0 . 1 4 5 - 0 . 0 0 4 0 . 0 2 7 - 0 . 0 0 4 0 . 0 9 8 - 0 . 0 0 4 0 . 0 4 5 
14 0.005 0.150 0.002 0.030 0.008 0.106 0.008 0.053 
15 -0.010 0.140 0.013 0.042 -0.021 0.085 0.011 0.064 
16 0.002 0.142 -0.003 0.039 -0.006 0.078 -0.010 0.055 
17 -0.003 0.139 0.006 0.046 0.001 0.079 0.005 0.060 
18 0.005 0.144 -0,001 0.045 0.007 0.086 0.000 0.060 
19 -0.012 0.133 0.011 0.056 -0.010 0.076 0.006 0.066 
20 -0.001 0.131 0.012 0.068 0.003 0.079 0.007 0.073 
The sample constists of a total of 77 semi-annual or annual earnings annoucemnts for the forty two H shares in the Hang 
Seng index for the five and half year period January 1994 to July 1999. Two models are considerd for the normal returns,the 
market model using the Hang Seng Index and the constant mean return model. The announcements are catergorized into 
two groups, good earnings and bad earnings, r；" is the sample average abnormal return for the specified day in event time 
and CAR is the sample average cumulative abnormal return for day -20 to the specified day. Event time is measured in days 
relative to the annoucement date.Standard errors ,respectively, 0.004,0.006,0.005 and 0.004. f-statistic, respectively,-8, 1.3, 
7.6, 3.25. 
Table4.2 abnormal return for an event study of the information content of earnings announcements II 
HSI 一 H S C E I 
Event Day Good Earnings Bad Earnings Good Earnings Bad Earnings  
s* CAR CAR CAR s* CAR 
-20 0.008 0.008 -0.004 -0.004 0.003 0.003 0.000 0.000 
_19 0.014 0.022 -0.001 -0.005 0.010 0.013 0.000 0.000 
_18 0.015 0.037 0.014 0.009 0.010 0.022 0.000 0.000 
-17 0.007 0.043 -0.003 0.006 0.006 0.029 -0.002 -0.003 
-16 0.008 0.052 -0.011 -0.006 0.006 0.035 -0.009 -0.012 
-15 0.004 0.056 -0.006 -0.012 0.004 0.039 -0.016 -0.027 
-14 0.001 0.057 0.005 -0.007 0.003 0.042 0.002 -0.025 
-13 0.002 0.059 -0.008 -0.015 0.002 0.044 -0.013 -0.038 
-12 0.007 0.066 -0.003 -0.018 0.005 0.049 -0.001 -0.039 
-11 0.005 0.071 0.002 -0.016 0.003 0.052 0.003 -0.035 
-10 0.007 0.078 -0.003 -0.019 0.004 0.056 0.003 -0.033 
-9 -0.006 0.072 0.007 -0.012 -0.002 0.054 0.008 -0.025 
-8 -0.005 0.067 -0.004 -0,016 -0.006 0.049 0.002 -0.023 
-7 0.005 0.072 -0.002 -0.018 0.003 0.052 -0.002 -0.025 
-6 0.009 0.081 -0.005 -0.024 0.005 0.057 -0.001 -0.026 
-5 -0.001 0.081 0.000 -0.024 0.005 0.063 -0.004 -0.029 
-4 0.020 0.100 0.011 -0.013 0.014 0.076 0.004 -0.026 
-3 -0.005 0.095 0.009 -0.004 -0.003 0.073 0.007 -0.019 
-2 0.002 0.097 0.019 0.015 0.003 0.077 0.014 -0.005 
-1 -0.005 0.093 -0.003 0.012 -0.001 0.076 -0.003 -0.008 
0 -0.032 0.061 0.008 0.020 -0.028 0.048 0.002 -0.006 
1 -0.012 0.048 0.024 0.044 -0.013 0.035 0.023 0.017 
2 0.013 0.062 -0.017 0.027 0.012 0.047 -0.009 0.009 
3 0.001 0.063 -0.002 0.025 0.000 0.046 -0.002 0.007 
4 0.012 0.075 -0.001 0.024 0.007 0.054 0.004 0.011 
5 -0.009 0.066 0.000 0.024 -0.008 0.046 0.006 0.016 
6 0.007 0.073 -0.002 0,022 -0.004 0.042 0.000 0.016 
7 0.009 0.082 -0.001 0.020 0.013 0.055 -0.012 0.004 
8 0.012 0.093 0.010 0.030 0.000 0.055 0.004 0.009 
9 0 . 0 2 5 0 . 1 1 8 0 . 0 0 4 0 . 0 3 4 0 . 0 1 6 0 . 0 7 1 0 . 0 0 6 0 . 0 1 4 
10 0.023 0.141 0.001 0.035 0.013 0.084 0.005 0.019 
11 -0.008 0.133 -0.001 0.034 -0.015 0.070 -0.008 0.011 
12 0.010 0.143 -0.003 0.031 -0.003 0.067 -0.011 0.000 
13 0.002 0.145 -0.004 0.027 -0.001 0.066 -0.007 -0.007 
14 0.005 0.150 0.002 0.030 0.003 0.069 0.002 -0.005 
15 -0.010 0.140 0.013 0.042 -0.014 0.055 0.004 -0.002 
16 0.002 0.142 -0.003 0.039 -0.006 0.049 -0.008 -0.010 
17 -0.003 0.139 0.006 0.046 -0.003 0.046 0.004 -0.006 
18 0.005 0.144 -0.001 0.045 -0.003 0.043 -0.010 -0.016 
19 -0.012 0.133 0.011 0.056 -0.009 0.034 -0.007 -0.024 
20 -0.001 0.131 0.012 0.068 -0.002 0.032 0.003 -0.020 
The sample constists of a total of 77 semi-annual or annual earnings annoucemnts for the forty two H shares in the Hang Seng 
index for the five and half year period January 1994 to July 1999. Two index models are considerd for the normal returns, one 
uses the Hang Seng Index and the other uses Hang Seng China Enterprises Index. The announcements are catergorized into 
two groups, good earnings and bad earnings, is the sample average abnormal return for the specified day in event time and 
CAR is the sample average cumulative abnormal return for day -20 to the specified day. Event time is measured in days 
relative to the annoucement date.Standard errors,respectively, 0.004,0.006,0.005,andO.004. f-statistic, respectively,-8,1.33,-
5.6’ 0.5. 
Table4.3 Regression Results-Good Earnings Announcements 
Dependent Variable:CAR(0,1)  
V a r i a b l e HSI HSI HSCEI HSCEI  
Past Return 0.585 0.271 0.285 0.078 
(-1.898) (0.822) (1.145) (0.321) 
LogSize 0.049 0.017 0.079 0.014 
(1.088) (2.974) (2.153) (3.310) 
Sales Growth -0.013 -0.051 -0.042 -0.054 
(-0.710) (-2.415) (-2.822) (-3.409) 
ROA 0.409 0.238 0.066 0.087 
(2.285) (1.012) (0.456) (0.500) 
ROE Growth -0.074 -0.001 0.019 0.024 
(-2.739) (-0.052) (0.890) (1.414) 
Industry Dummy 
Raw Materials -0.050 ... -0.178 ... 
(-0.388) (-1.696) 
Consumer Products -0.162 ... -0.162 ... 
(-1.111) (-1.381) 
Manufacturing -0.149 ... -0.168 ... 
(-1.354) (-1.892) 
Transportations -0.089 ... -0.208 ... 
(-0.662) (-1.906) 
Adjusted R2 0.456 0.285 0.447 0.354 
F 2.446 5.238 2.971 
Note.----f-statistic are in parentheses. Variables: Past return=the real return from -20 days to -1 
days;LogSize=log(outstanding H shares in the current year); Sales Growth= (t-1 year's sales over t-2 
year's sales) -1;the R O A = the previous year's return on assets;ROE Growth= (t-1 year's R O E over t-2 
year's R〇E)-1, R O E means return on equity; Industry d u m m y variables=dumnny variables for each 
industry, including Raw Materials, Consumer Products, Manufacturing, Transportation; 
Table 4.4a Regression Results- Bad Earnings Announcements 
Dependent Variable:CAR(0,1)  
V a r i a b l e HSI HSI HSCEI HSCEI  
Past Return -0.426 -0.491 0.262 0.168 
(-0.797) (-1.015) (0.567) (0.403) 
LogSize -0.052 -0.026 -0.035 -0.018 
(-0.703) (-2.600) (-0.551) (-2.118) 
Sales Growth -0.037 -0.040 -0.024 -0.029 
(-1.184) (-1.457) (-0.915) (-1.212) 
ROA 1.084 1.149 0.561 0.610 
(1.773) (2.081) (1.060) (1.278) 
ROE Growth -0.002 -0.002 0.000 0.000 
(-0.542) (-0.702) (0.139) (-0.019) 
Industry Dummy 
Raw Materials 0.072 ... 0.060 ... 
(0.327) (0.314) 
Consumer Products 0.105 ... 0.082 ... 
(0.422) (0.380) 
Manufacturing 0.049 ... 0.023 ... 
(0.292) (0.154) 
Transportations 0.121 ... 0.066 ... 
(0.499) (0.313) 
Adjusted r2 -0.101 0.033 -0.165 -0.020 
F 0.700 1.270 0.515 0.909 
Note.——t- statistic are in parentheses Variables: Past retu「n=the real return from -20 days to -1 
days;LogSize=log(outstanding H shares in the current year); Sales Growth: (t-1 year's sales over t-2 
year's sales) -1;the R O A = the previous year's return on assets;ROE Growth^ (t-1 year's R O E over t-2 
year's R〇E)-1, R O E means return on equity; Industry d u m m y variables=dummy variables for each 
industry, including Raw Materials, Consumer Products, Manufacturing, Transportation; 
Table4.4b Regression Results- Bad Earnings Announcements without Clustering and Depedence 
Dependent Variable:CAR(0,1)  
V a r i a b l e HSI HSI HSCEI HSCEI  
Past Return -0.134 -0.202 0.501 0.387 
(-0.214) (-0.377) (1.016) (0.911) 
LogSize -0.065 -0.006 -0.049 0.006 
(-0.774) (-0.354) (-0.746) (0.414) 
Sales Growth -0.107 -0.106 -0.105 -0.105 
(-2.171) (-2.550) (-2.714) (-3.170) 
ROA 0.478 0.619 -0.174 -0.060 
(0.600) (0.886) -0.277 -0.108 
ROE Growth 0.052 0.051 0.067 0.068 
(1.156) (1.320) (1.882) (2.218) 
Industry Dummy 
Raw Materials 0.170 ... 0.168 ... 
(0.683) (0.857) 
Consumer Products 0.211 ... 0.202 ... 
(0.770) (0.936) 
Manufacturing 0.123 ... 0.112 ... 
(0.636) (0.730) 
Transportations 0.212 ... 0.174 ... 
(0.779) (0.809) 
Adjusted r2 0.028 0.168 0.142 0.257 
_F 1.151 2.209 1.598 3.052 
Note.----t-statistic are in parentheses. Variables: Past retum=the real return from -20 days to -1 
days;LogSize=log(outstanding H shares in the current year); Sales Growth^ (t-1 year's sales over t-2 year's 
sales) -1;the R O A = the previous year's return on assets;ROE Growth= (t-1 year's R O E over t-2 year's R O E ) 
1, R O E means return on equity; Industry d u m m y va「iables=dummy variables for each industry, including 
Raw Materials, Consumer Products, Manufacturing, Transportation; 
Table4.5 abnormal return for an event study of the information content of earnings announcements II 
HSI Model Gonstant-Mean-Peturn Model  
Event Day Good News Bad News 一 Good News Bad News 
s* CAR s* CAR “ s* CAR s* CAR 
-0.018 -0.018 0.006 -0.023 -0.023 -0.003 -0.003 
-19 -0.024 -0.042 -0.014 -0.008 -0.028 -0.051 -0.003 -0.006 
-18 0.006 -0.036 0.013 0.005 -0.001 -0.053 0.021 0.015 
-17 0.010 -0.026 0.003 0.008 0.000 -0.053 0.000 0.015 
-16 -0.002 -0.028 -0.004 0.004 -0.001 -0.053 -0.003 0.012 
-15 -0.011 -0.039 -0.005 -0.001 -0.010 -0.063 -0.011 0.001 
-14 -0.012 -0.051 0.013 0.012 -0.009 -0.072 0.014 0.015 
-13 0.035 -0.016 0.013 0.025 0.040 -0.032 0.002 0.016 
-12 0.029 0.013 -0.015 0.010 0.032 0.000 -0.016 0.001 
-11 -0.019 -0.006 0.002 0.012 -0.012 -0.012 -0.005 -0.004 
-10 0.000 -0.005 0.008 0.020 -0.011 -0.023 0.008 0.003 
-9 0.020 0.015 -0.009 0.011 0.009 -0.014 0.001 0.005 
-8 -0.019 -0.004 0.005 0.015 0.004 -0.010 0.010 0.015 
-7 0.031 0.027 -0.001 0.014 0.021 0.011 -0.003 0.012 
-6 0.006 0.032 0.009 0.024 0.007 0.018 0.005 0.017 
-5 0.029 0.061 0.010 0.034 0.031 0.048 0.003 0.020 
-4 -0.005 0.056 0.005 0.039 -0.017 0.031 0.007 0.026 
-3 -0.016 0.040 0.005 0.044 -0.015 0.016 0.006 0.033 
-2 -0.010 0.029 0.011 0.055 -0.017 0.000 0.015 0.048 
-1 0.009 0.038 0.028 0.084 0.012 0.011 0.018 0.065 
0 0.005 0.043 -0.004 0.079 0.014 0.025 -0.011 0.055 
1 0.003 0.046 -0.007 0.073 0.005 0.031 -0.017 0.038 
2 0.008 0.054 0.005 0.077 0.005 0.036 -0.002 0.036 
3 0.017 0.071 -0.005 0.073 0.021 0.057 -0.005 0.031 
4 0.011 0.082 -0.004 0.068 0.001 0.058 -0.007 0.023 
5 -0.016 0.066 -0.003 0.065 -0.010 0.048 -0.012 0.011 
6 -0.009 0.058 -0.028 0.037 -0.012 0.036 -0.023 -0.011 
7 0.037 0.095 -0.008 0.029 0.028 0.065 -0.010 -0.021 
8 -0.001 0.093 0.024 0.053 -0.016 0.048 0.021 0.000 
9 0.003 0.097 -0.005 0.048 0.009 0.057 -0.005 -0.005 
1 0 - 0 . 0 0 9 0 . 0 8 7 - 0 . 0 2 9 0 . 0 1 9 - 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0 4 7 - 0 . 0 3 5 - 0 . 0 4 1 
11 -0.011 0.077 0,002 0.022 -0.011 0.035 -0.011 -0.052 
12 -0.008 0.069 0.022 0.044 0.004 0.040 0.019 -0.033 
13 -0.023 0.046 -0.001 0.043 -0.018 0.021 0.005 -0.028 
14 0.021 0.067 0.005 0.048 0.011 0.032 0.006 -0.022 
15 - 0 . 0 0 5 0 . 0 6 3 - 0 . 0 3 2 0 . 0 1 6 - 0 . 0 0 4 0 . 0 2 8 - 0 . 0 2 7 - 0 . 0 4 9 
16 -0.013 0.050 -0.014 0.001 -0.010 0.018 -0.014 -0.063 
17 0.007 0.057 0.037 0.038 0.003 0.020 0.028 -0.035 
18 0.039 0.096 -0.001 0.037 0.044 0.065 -0.012 -0.048 
19 0.017 0.113 -0.009 0.028 0.027 0.092 -0.003 -0.051 
20 -0.001 0.112 0.005 0.033 0.005 0.097 0.012 -0.039 
The sample consists of a total of 41 relevant news reports for the forty two H shares companies in the Hang Seng Index for 
the five and half year period January 1994 to July 1999. Two models are considered for the normal returns, the market 
models are considered for the normal returns, the market model using the Hang Seng Index and the constant mean return 
model. The announcements are catergorized into two groups, good news and bad news, e* is the sample average abnormal 
return fo the specified day in event time and CAR is the sample average cumulative abnormal return for day -20 to the 
specified day. Event time is measured in days relative to the announcement date. Standard errors , respectively, 
0.007,0.004,0.007 and 0.005. f-statistic,respectively,0.71 , -1,2, -2.2. 
Table4.6 abnormal return for an event study of the information content of earnings announcements II 
HSI Model HSCEI Model — 
Event Day Good News Bad News “ Good News Bad News 
S* CAR S* CAR S* CAR S* CAR 
-20 -0.018 -0.018 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.0049 -0.001 -0.001 
-19 -0.024 -0.042 -0.014 -0.008 -0.003 0.0018 -0.020 -0.021 
_18 0.006 -0.036 0.013 0.005 0.003 0.0044 0.010 -0.010 
_17 0.010 -0.026 0.003 0.008 0.008 0.0122 0.004 -0.006 
-16 -0.002 -0.028 -0.004 0.004 0.005 0.0174 -0.008 -0.014 
-15 -0.011 -0.039 -0.005 -0.001 0.010 0.0275 -0.015 -0.029 
-14 -0.012 -0.051 0.013 0.012 0.006 0.0334 -0.012 -0.041 
-13 0.035 -0.016 0.013 0.025 -0.001 0.0322 0.015 -0.026 
-12 0.029 0.013 -0.015 0.010 -0.016 0.0158 0.001 -0.025 
-11 -0.019 -0.006 0.002 0.012 0.002 0.0181 -0.021 -0.046 
-10 0.000 -0.005 0.008 0.020 0.002 0.0204 -0.003 -0.049 
-9 0.020 0.015 -0.009 0.011 -0.009 0.0111 0.009 -0.041 
-8 -0.019 -0.004 0.005 0.015 0.006 0.0175 -0.004 -0.045 
-7 0.031 0.027 -0.001 0.014 -0.006 0.0118 0.012 -0.033 
-6 0.006 0.032 0.009 0.024 0.004 0.0163 0.009 -0.024 
-5 0.029 0.061 0.010 0.034 0.014 0.0299 0.017 -0.007 
-4 -0.005 0.056 0.005 0.039 0.009 0.0388 0.000 -0.007 
-3 -0.016 0.040 0.005 0.044 -0.003 0.0354 -0.016 -0.023 
-2 -0.010 0.029 0.011 0.055 -0.006 0.0297 -0.010 -0.033 
-1 0.009 0.038 0.028 0.084 0.028 0.0573 -0.004 -0.037 
0 0.005 0.043 -0.004 0.079 -0.006 0.0515 -0.003 -0.040 
1 0.003 0.046 -0.007 0.073 -0.006 0.0459 -0.003 -0.043 
2 0.008 0.054 0.005 0.077 0.002 0.0484 0.005 -0.038 
3 0.017 0.071 -0.005 0.073 -0.007 0.0417 0.014 -0.023 
4 0.011 0.082 -0.004 0.068 -0.012 0.0293 -0.003 -0.026 
5 -0.016 0.066 -0.003 0.065 -0.006 0.0237 -0.011 -0.037 
6 - 0 . 0 0 9 0 . 0 5 8 - 0 . 0 2 8 0 . 0 3 7 - 0 . 0 1 8 0 . 0 0 6 - 0 . 0 1 3 - 0 . 0 4 9 
7 0.037 0.095 -0.008 0.029 -0.001 0.0051 0.024 -0.025 
8 -0.001 0.093 0.024 0.053 0.024 0.0291 0.005 -0.021 
9 0.003 0.097 -0.005 0.048 -0.003 0.0263 -0.003 -0.024 
10 -0.009 0.087 -0.029 0.019 -0.023 0.0033 -0.008 -0.032 
11 -0.011 0.077 0.002 0.022 0.009 0.012 -0.007 -0.039 
12 -0.008 0.069 0.022 0.044 0.024 0.0359 -0.002 -0.040 
13 -0.023 0.046 -0.001 0.043 0.002 0.0376 -0.008 -0.048 
14 0.021 0.067 0.005 0.048 0.004 0.0411 0.002 -0.046 
1 5 - 0 . 0 0 5 0 . 0 6 3 - 0 . 0 3 2 0 . 0 1 6 - 0 . 0 2 0 0 . 0 2 0 8 - 0 . 0 0 4 - 0 . 0 4 9 
16 -0.013 0.050 -0.014 0.001 -0.007 0.0133 -0.009 -0.058 
17 0.007 0.057 0.037 0.038 0.029 0.0421 -0.001 -0.060 
18 0.039 0.096 -0.001 0.037 -0.004 0.0383 0.047 -0.013 
19 0.017 0.113 -0.009 0.028 -0.002 0.036 0.022 0.009 
2 0 -0.001 0.112 0.005 0.033 0.000 0.0359 -0.004 0.005 
The sample consists of a total of 41 relevant news reports for the forty two H shares companies in the Hang Seng Index for 
the five and half year period January 1994 to July 1999. Two index models are considered for the normal returns, one is 
Hang Seng Index,and the other is Hang Seng China Enterprises Index. The announcements are catergorized into two 
groups, good news and bad news, e* is the sample average abnormal return fo the specified day in event time and CAR is 
the sample average cumulative abnormal return for day -20 to the specified day. Event time is measured in days relative to 
the announcement date. Standard errors, respectively, 0.007,0.004,0.005 and 0.007. t-statistic, respectively,0.71 , -1 , -1 .2 , -
0.43. 
Table4.7 abnormal return for an event study of the information content of seasonal equity 
offerings, M&A and New Projects  
HSI Model Gonstsnt—MesrhfReturn Model  
Event Day S E P M & A N e w Projects S E P M & A N e w Projects 
s* CAR s* CAR s* CAR s* CAR s* CAR s* CAR 
-20 -0.011 -0.011 0.010 0.010 0.003 0.003 -0.011 -0.011 -0.006 -0.006 -0.004 -0.004 
-19 0.000 -0.011 -0.010 0.001 0.006 0.008 0.000 -0.012 -0.017 -0.022 0.025 0.021 
-18 0.013 0.001 -0.018 -0.018 -0.002 0.006 0.009 -0.002 -0.011 -0.034 -0.007 0.013 
-17 0.015 0.016 -0.016 -0.034 0.007 0.014 0.007 0.005 -0.004 -0.037 -0.003 0.011 
-16 0.016 0.032 0.024 -0.010 -0.008 0.006 0.016 0.021 0.020 -0.017 -0.012 -0.001 
-15 -0.002 0.030 -0.031 -0.041 0.051 0.057 0.004 0.026 -0.030 -0.047 0.046 0.045 
-14 0.002 0.032 0.000 -0.041 -0.010 0.047 -0.002 0.024 0.012 -0.035 -0.015 0.030 
-13 0.005 0.038 0.000 -0.040 0.001 0.047 0.001 0.025 0.005 -0.030 0.012 0.042 
-12 -0.001 0.037 0.011 -0.029 0.029 0.077 -0.005 0.020 0.015 -0.015 0.031 0.073 
-11 -0.007 0.029 0.006 -0.023 -0.012 0.065 -0.010 0.010 -0.005 -0.020 -0.007 0.066 
-10 0.003 0.032 0.001 -0.022 0.011 0.076 -0.001 0.009 0.004 -0.017 0.019 0.085 
-9 0.008 0.040 -0.009 -0.031 0.009 0.085 0.006 0.015 -0.017 -0.033 0.014 0.098 
-8 0.006 0.046 -0.009 -0.039 -0.020 0.065 0.009 0.023 -0.008 -0.042 -0.026 0.072 
-7 -0.004 0.042 -0.011 -0.050 0.002 0.067 -0.006 0.018 -0.008 -0.050 0.013 0.085 
-6 -0.002 0.040 0.008 -0.043 0.015 0.081 -0.002 0.016 0.004 -0.046 0.015 0.100 
-5 0.012 0.052 0.001 -0.041 -0.034 0.047 0.009 0.025 0.003 -0.043 -0.023 0.077 
-4 0.001 0.053 0.020 -0.022 0.010 0.058 0.001 0.026 0.030 -0.013 0.013 0.090 
-3 0.012 0.065 0.001 -0.021 -0.010 0.047 0.015 0.041 0.017 0.004 -0.024 0.066 
-2 -0.010 0.056 0.008 -0.013 -0.019 0.029 -0.003 0.038 0.003 0.007 -0.002 0.064 
-1 0.024 0.080 0.041 0.028 0.000 0.029 0.021 0.059 0.040 0.047 -0.003 0.061 
0 0.012 0.092 0.023 0.051 0.030 0.059 0.014 0.073 0.019 0.066 0.019 0.080 
1 0.007 0.099 -0.009 0.042 0.030 0.089 0.002 0.075 -0.010 0.056 0.017 0.097 
2 -0.007 0.091 0.003 0.045 -0.004 0.085 -0.005 0.070 -0.003 0.053 0.015 0.112 
3 -0.019 0.072 -0.011 0.035 -0.012 0.073 -0.021 0.049 -0.015 0.038 -0.009 0.103 
4 0.012 0.084 0.006 0.040 0.045 0.118 0.012 0.061 -0.013 0.025 0.047 0.150 
5 -0.018 0.066 0.011 0.052 -0.027 0.091 -0.010 0.051 0.023 0.048 -0.007 0.143 
6 0.006 0.072 0.005 0.057 0.026 0.117 0.005 0.056 0.002 0.050 0.030 0.173 
7 0.003 0.074 0.022 0.079 0.049 0.166 -0.002 0.054 0.015 0.065 0.040 0.213 
8 0.011 0.085 -0.021 0.058 -0.001 0.164 0.016 0.070 0.000 0.065 0.000 0.212 
9 0.001 0.086 0.010 0.068 0.001 0.166 0.003 0.074 0.007 0.071 -0.019 0.194 
10 -0.006 0.080 0.006 0.074 0.002 0.167 -0.001 0.072 0.000 0.072 0.003 0.197 
11 0.012 0.092 -0.023 0.052 0.016 0.184 0.016 0.088 -0.015 0.057 0.009 0.206 
12 -0.016 0.075 0.002 0.054 0.059 0.243 -0.016 0.072 -0.001 0.056 0.050 0.256 
13 0.003 0.079 0.016 0.070 -0.038 0.205 -0.005 0.067 0.010 0.066 -0.049 0.208 
14 0.006 0.085 0.002 0.072 0.028 0.233 0.006 0.074 0.006 0.072 0.017 0.225 
15 0.003 0.088 -0.013 0.059 -0.015 0.218 0.001 0.074 -0.015 0.057 -0.027 0.198 
16 -0.017 0.070 0.004 0.063 -0.019 0.200 -0.019 0.055 -0.003 0.054 0.001 0.199 
17 0.012 0.083 0.005 0.067 0.018 0.217 0.015 0.070 0.012 0.066 0.016 0.215 
18 0.019 0.102 -0.020 0.047 0.017 0.235 0.018 0.088 -0.020 0.046 0.027 0.243 
19 0.034 0.136 0.005 0.052 -0.008 0.226 0.032 0.120 0.004 0.050 -0.009 0.234 
20 0.001 0.137 0.002 0.054 -0.022 0.204 -0.004 0.115 0.011 0.061 -0.017 0.216 
The sample consists of a total of 32 anouncements for the forty two H shares companies in the Hang Seng Index for the 
five and half year period January 1994 to July 1999. Two models are considered for the normal returns, the market models 
are considered for the normal returns, the market model using the Hang Seng Index and the constant mean return model. 
The announcements are catergorized into three groups, 10 seasonal eauity offerrings, 16 merge and acquisition and only 
6 new projects, e* is the sample average abnormal return fo the specified day in event time and CAR is the sample 
average cumulative abnormal return for day -20 to the specified day. Event time is measured in days relative to the 
announcement date.Standard errors,respectively,0.005,0.007,0.012,0.005,0.007and0.012. f-statistic, respectively, 2.4, 
3.28’ 2.5’ 2.8’ 2.7, 1.59. 
Table4.8 abnormal return for an event study of the information content of seasonal equity 
offerings, M&A and New Projects II  
HSI ""“ HSCEI 
Event Day SEP M&A New Projects SEP *M & A New Projects 
s* CAR s* CAR s* CAR 8* CAR s* CAR s* CAR 
-20 -0.011 -0.011 0.010 0.010 0.003 0.003 -0.012 -0.012 0.009 0.009 0.001 0.001 
-19 0.000 -0.011 -0.010 0.001 0.006 0.008 -0.005 -0.016 0.002 0.011 0.017 0.018 
_18 0.013 0.001 -0.018 -0.018 -0.002 0.006 0.001 -0.015 -0.002 0.009 -0.005 0.012 
-17 0.015 0.016 -0.016 -0.034 0.007 0.014 -0.002 -0.017 -0.017 -0.008 0.000 0.013 
-16 0.016 0.032 0.024 -0.010 -0.008 0.006 0.006 -0.011 0.019 0.011 -0.002 0.010 
-15 -0.002 0.030 -0.031 -0.041 0.051 0.057 -0.006 -0.017 -0.021 -0.010 0.021 0.031 
-14 0.002 0.032 0.000 -0.041 -0.010 0.047 -0.009 -0.026 0.003 -0.006 -0.002 0.029 
-13 0.005 0.038 0.000 -0.040 0.001 0.047 0.006 -0.021 0.002 -0.005 0.008 0.037 
-12 -0.001 0.037 0.011 -0.029 0.029 0.077 -0.003 -0.024 0.014 0.009 0.014 0.051 
-11 -0.007 0.029 0.006 -0.023 -0.012 0.065 -0.006 -0.030 0.010 0.020 0.004 0.055 
-10 0.003 0.032 0.001 -0.022 0.011 0.076 0.005 -0.024 0.013 0.033 0.006 0.061 
-9 0.008 0.040 -0.009 -0.031 0.009 0.085 0.013 -0.012 0.003 0.036 0.012 0.073 
-8 0.006 0.046 -0.009 -0.039 -0.020 0.065 0.013 0.001 -0.009 0.026 0.003 0.076 
-7 -0.004 0.042 -0.011 -0.050 0.002 0.067 -0.008 -0.007 -0.001 0.025 -0.018 0.058 
-6 -0.002 0.040 0.008 -0.043 0.015 0.081 -0.006 -0.013 0.003 0.029 0.019 0.077 
-5 0.012 0.052 0.001 -0.041 -0.034 0.047 0.004 -0.009 -0.002 0.027 -0.021 0.055 
-4 0.001 0.053 0.020 -0.022 0.010 0.058 0.000 -0.009 0.017 0.044 0.005 0.061 
-3 0.012 0.065 0.001 -0.021 -0.010 0.047 0.010 0.001 -0.010 0.035 -0.008 0.052 
-2 -0.010 0.056 0.008 -0.013 -0.019 0.029 -0.021 -0.021 0.014 0.048 -0.004 0.048 
-1 0.024 0.080 0.041 0.028 0.000 0.029 0.010 -0.010 0.042 0.091 0.006 0.053 
0 0.012 0.092 0.023 0.051 0.030 0.059 0.006 -0.004 0.009 0.100 0.011 0.064 
1 0.007 0.099 -0.009 0.042 0.030 0.089 0.009 0.005 -0.007 0.093 0.016 0.080 
2 -0.007 0.091 0.003 0.045 -0.004 0.085 0.007 0.012 0.006 0.099 -0.005 0.076 
3 -0.019 0.072 -0.011 0.035 -0.012 0.073 -0.014 -0.002 -0.006 0.093 -0.019 0.057 
4 0.012 0.084 0.006 0.040 0.045 0.118 0.013 0.011 -0.003 0.089 0.015 0.072 
5 -0.018 0.066 0.011 0.052 -0.027 0.091 -0.016 -0.005 0.021 0.110 -0.033 0.039 
6 0.006 0.072 0.005 0.057 0.026 0.117 -0.006 -0.011 0.005 0.116 0.004 0.043 
7 0.003 0.074 0.022 0.079 0.049 0.166 -0.009 -0.020 0.023 0.138 0.039 0.082 
8 0.011 0.085 -0.021 0.058 -0.001 0.164 -0.002 -0.021 -0.018 0.120 -0.001 0.081 
9 0.001 0.086 0.010 0.068 0.001 0.166 -0.004 -0.026 -0.010 0.110 0.000 0.081 
10 -0.006 0.080 0.006 0.074 0.002 0.167 0.001 -0.025 0.005 0.115 -0.019 0.062 
11 0.012 0.092 -0.023 0.052 0.016 0.184 0.009 -0.016 -0.009 0.106 0.008 0.070 
12 -0.016 0.075 0.002 0.054 0.059 0.243 -0.012 -0.028 0.000 0.106 0.047 0.117 
13 0.003 0.079 0.016 0.070 -0.038 0.205 0.000 -0.028 0.007 0.113 -0.036 0.081 
14 0.006 0.085 0.002 0.072 0.028 0.233 0.002 -0.025 0.006 0.119 0.016 0.097 
15 0.003 0.088 -0.013 0.059 -0.015 0.218 0.002 -0.023 -0.006 0.113 -0.018 0.079 
16 -0.017 0.070 0.004 0.063 -0.019 0.200 -0.017 -0.040 -0.005 0.108 -0.010 0.069 
17 0.012 0.083 0.005 0.067 0.018 0.217 0.006 -0.035 -0.008 0.100 0.007 0.076 
18 0.019 0.102 -0.020 0.047 0.017 0.235 0.007 -0.027 -0.021 0.078 0.011 0.087 
19 0.034 0.136 0.005 0.052 -0.008 0.226 0.018 -0.009 0.013 0.091 -0.010 0.077 
20 0.001 0.137 0.002 0.054 -0.022 0.204 0.000 -0.010 0.004 0.095 -0.008 0.069 
The sample consists of a total of 32 anouncements for the forty two H shares companies in the Hang Seng Index for the 
five and half year period January 1994 to July 1999. Two index models are considered for the normal returns, one is Hang 
Seng Index model, and the other is Hang Seng China Enterprises Index model. The announcements are catergorized into 
three groups, 10 seasonal eauity offerrings, 16 merge and acquisition and only 6 new projects, s* is the sample average 
abnormal return fo the specified day in event time and CAR is the sample average cumulative abnormal return for day -20 
to the specified day. Event time is measured in days relative to the announcement date.Standard errors , respectively, are 




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































> . •： 
t - •• 
• .. >'；: . J,.…Ji.k .. -
,... ⑶满麟f:表麵：縁滅 
CUHK L i b r a r i e s 
1_111_11圓 
Q D 3 f l 7 1 5 M 5 
